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ABSTRACT 
One of the biggest challenges the U.S. contends with is how foreign nationals are 
using the legal immigration system to embed themselves in the country.  While not every 
person who commits immigration fraud is a terrorist, those who intend to do this country 
harm will likely engage in some form of immigration fraud or seek to evade immigration 
laws in order to gain admission into or remain in this country in an immigration status. 
Since the September 11, 2001 attacks, the reality that foreign terrorists seek to exploit 
loopholes in the international travel system to facilitate the planning and implementation 
of attacks has become clearer.  This thesis explores the interconnected relationship 
between immigration and terrorism.  It will illustrate how border security can be 
strengthened if terrorists’ access to immigration benefits is denied. In order to ascertain 
how terrorist have been able to successfully manipulate the immigration system and 
avoid detection, this study analyzes the immigration histories of terrorists involved in 
four case studies.  This analysis shows that rather than focus on one benefit category or 
manner of entry, terrorists will utilize all means available in order to gain admission into 
or remain in the country.  The recommendations provided based on this analysis focus on 
all facets of the immigration system and apply a holistic approach to immigration reform. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Because the current terrorist threat continues to involve an identifiable threat from 
foreign nationals coming to the United States, enhancing the integrity of the legal 
immigration system can be an important mechanism to prevent future attacks. The ability 
to obtain a visa or other legal immigration status is a key component of terrorist mobility.  
The only way foreign terrorists can legally gain admission into the United States is to 
obtain some type of immigration benefit, such as an immigrant or nonimmigrant visa 
(Camarota, 2002b).  Although the legal immigration system was considered vulnerable to 
exploitation by terrorists prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks, insufficient efforts have 
been taken to reduce that vulnerability.  Enhancing its integrity was not seen as a vital 
component of an effective homeland security strategy (National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks upon the United States [National Commission], 2004).  Since those attacks, the 
reality that foreign terrorists seek to exploit loopholes in the international travel system to 
facilitate the operational planning of attacks has become clearer. 
While not every person who commits immigration fraud is a terrorist, those who 
intend to do this country harm will likely engage in some form of immigration fraud or 
seek to evade immigration laws in order to gain admission into or remain in this country 
in an immigration status.  This thesis will explore how immigration and terrorism are 
interrelated.  It will illustrate how border security can be significantly enhanced if 
terrorists’ access to immigration benefits is denied.  In order to ascertain how terrorist 
have been able to successfully manipulate the immigration system and avoid detection, 
this study will analyze the immigration histories of terrorists involved in four case 
studies.  This analysis will be used to identify the reforms to the legal immigration system 
that are needed.   
By eliminating opportunities to exploit weaknesses in the legal immigration 
system, this nation can strengthen national security significantly by hindering terrorists’ 
attempts to enter or remain in this country.  Although no immigration system can be 
completely secure against exploitation, it can be an effective counterterrorism tool.  The 
 xii
immigration system does not need to be completely invulnerable to exploitation to be an 
effective means to constrain terrorist activity.  If merely some of the members of a plot 
are detected, it may be sufficient to disrupt the plot (Camarota, 2002b).  Therefore, 
reforming the immigration system should be one component of the overall strategy to 
strengthen national security.  When combined with other key components the end result 
is an increased level of security for the nation.   
The focus of this study is to evaluate how comprehensive immigration reform can 
be used as one of the many tools used to combat terrorism. The eight recommendations 
provided to mitigate the vulnerabilities identified through the analysis of the case studies 
focus on all facets of the immigration system and apply a holistic approach to identifying 
the necessary reforms.  They also seek to identify vulnerabilities not directly related to 
the benefit application process but nonetheless help facilitate terrorist mobility.  The 
recommendations include efforts to improve the ability to detect threats to national 
security through increased information sharing and proactive efforts to detect fraud.  
They also include aspects that focus on holding those who engage in illicit activities 
accountable, such as expanding administrative penalties for committing immigration 
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I. INTRODUCTION—THE NEXUS BETWEEN IMMIGRATION 
AND TERRORISM 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Because the current terrorist threat continues to involve an identifiable threat from 
foreign nationals coming to the United States, enhancing the integrity of the legal 
immigration system can be an important mechanism used to prevent future attacks 
(Camarota, 2002b).  Except for the Oklahoma City bombing, immigrants have played a 
significant role in all recent major terrorist attacks1 that have occurred in the United 
States and Western Europe (Leiken, 2004).  The ability to obtain a visa or other legal 
immigration status is a key component of terrorist mobility.  The only way foreign 
terrorists can legally gain admission into the United States is to obtain some type of 
immigration benefit, such as an immigrant or nonimmigrant visa (Camarota, 2002b).  
Terrorist organizations need operatives who have the ability to enter and reside in 
the target country in order to conduct surveillance on potential targets, finalize their plans 
and actually launch the attack.  They also need logistical support located within the 
country in order to facilitate financial transactions, arrange safe houses and make travel 
arrangements (National Counterterrorism Center, 2006).  Regardless of “whether the 
terrorist seeks mayhem by truck bomb or hijacked airplane, whether he carries a smallpox 
virus or sarin gas, to carry out his attack he himself must enter the country” (Leiken, 
2004, p. 24).  
Throughout the 1990s, foreign-born terrorists exploited several avenues to enter 
the country (Rudolph, 2006).  In her study examining terrorist travel patterns, Janice 
Kephart reported that representatives from every terrorist organization included within 
the scope of her study used fraud to some degree in order to gain admission into or 
remain in the country.  The level of fraud ranged from failures to disclose information on 
immigration forms to altered or forged documents (Kephart, 2005).  Another study found 
                                                 
1
 Major attacks are defined as those that involve significant loss of life, injuries or damage to property.   
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that of the 48 foreign-born Islamic extremists involved in terror plots in the United States 
between 1993 and 2001, 36 percent were naturalized citizens or permanent residents, 33 
percent obtained nonimmigrant visas, 6 percent sought political asylum and 25 percent 
entered the country illegally (Rudolph, 2006).  Although eight years have passed since 
the September 11, 2001 attacks, terrorists are still exploiting the legal immigration 
system.  As recently as September 24, 2009, 19-year-old Jordanian national Hosam 
Maher Husein Smadi was arrested for attempting to bomb a Dallas skyscraper.  He was 
admitted to the country in early 2007 on a tourist visa.  When his authorized period of 
admission expired, he proceeded to remain in the country illegally.  His arrest renewed 
concerns about vulnerabilities in the security of the immigration system (McKinely & 
Preston, 2009).   
The interconnected relationship between immigration and terrorism and how 
foreign nationals are using the legal immigration system to embed themselves in the 
country is one of the biggest challenges the United States confronts.  Unfortunately, 
individuals often attempt to obtain benefits that they are not eligible to receive by 
exploiting loopholes in the system.  Because the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(INS) and now the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)2 
processes such a variety of benefit types in numerous offices located throughout the 
country, there are significant opportunities for individuals to engage in fraudulent 
activities to obtain these benefits (Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2002).  
While not every person who commits immigration fraud is a terrorist, terrorist will likely 
engage in some form of immigration fraud or seek to evade immigration laws in order to 
obtain the ability to enter and remain in the county.  
In general, terrorist events are widely understood to be extremely low probability 
occurrences with very highly dangerous consequences.  Whether compared against the 
total number of airline passengers, or cargo containers shipped worldwide or, in this case, 
immigrants and visitors circulating around the globe, the number of mala fide events is 
                                                 
2
 One of the changes to domestic security that was implemented after the September 11, 2001 attacks 
was the dissolution of the INS and the relocation of its functions under the newly created Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) (Martin & Martin, 2004).  USCIS was the agency given responsibility for 
processing applications and petitions for immigration benefits. 
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statistically fairly negligible.  In the current case, the percentage of cases involving 
terrorists is low when compared to the overall number of applications and petitions for 
immigrations benefits submitted.  Generally approximately 6 million applications and 
petitions are submitted to the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services every 
year (Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Inspector General [DHS OIG], 
2008).  The majority of cases do not involve individuals who commit immigration fraud 
or pose a threat to national security or public safety.  For example, in fiscal year 2005, 
75,532 individuals were removed from the country based on immigration fraud (Wasem, 
2008).  This represents 36 percent of all formal removals from the country for that year 
(Wasem, 2008).  The volume of benefits requested, the vast variety of benefit categories 
available, and the fairly low percentage of fraudulent submissions by terrorists combined 
creates significant challenges for efforts to detect and deter illicit activity.  
This thesis will explore how immigration and terrorism are interrelated.  It will 
illustrate how border security is significantly enhanced if terrorists’ access to these 
benefits is denied.  If terrorists are unable to enter or remain the country, their ability to 
carry out an attack is significantly diminished (Camarota, 2002b).  By eliminating 
opportunities to commit fraud, this nation can strengthen national security significantly 
by hindering terrorists’ attempts to enter or remain in this country.  Although no 
immigration system can be completely secure against exploitation, it can be an effective 
counterterrorism tool.  The immigration system does not need to be completely 
invulnerable to exploitation to be an effective means to constrain terrorist activity.  If 
merely some of the members of a plot are detected, it may be sufficient to disrupt the plot 
(Camarota, 2002b).  Therefore, reforming the immigration system should be one 
component of the overall strategy to strengthen national security.  When combined with 
other key components, such as intelligence gathering and analysis or use of the judicial 
system to prosecute convicted terrorists, the end result is an increased level of security for 
the nation.   
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B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There has been adequate research conducted to document that foreign terrorists 
have exploited immigration policy to further activities that threaten national security.  
The literature reviewed thoroughly describes the nature of the problem and the 
importance of enhancing border security.  The existing literature also indicates a 
widespread consensus that foreign terrorists have all-too-easily exploited the immigration 
system to pass through the country’s border security checkpoints and obtained significant 
immigration benefits such as citizenship or permanent resident status (Kephart, 2005).  
The topics and issues covered in this literature review are divided into two categories: the 
pre-September 11, 2001 environment and the post September 11, 2001 environment.  
This is because most of the literature indicates that prior to those attacks ensuring the 
integrity of the legal immigration system generally was not considered an essential 
element in protecting homeland security.  However, the immigration system began to be 
more universally viewed as a vulnerability to homeland security after the attacks of 
September 11, 2001.   
1. The Pre-September 11, 2001 Environment 
The United States historically has considered itself “a ‘nation of immigrants,’ a 
‘melting pot’ of courageous individuals from diverse origins who have come together to 
build a society built on freedom and equality” (Rudolph, 2006, p. 41).  Some of the 
literature reviewed indicated that security interests prior to September 11, 2001 focused 
on the social aspects of immigration, such as foreign nationals sneaking across the border 
in violation of U.S. laws.  In 1994, the Urban Institute published a report that was 
consistent with this view of migration.  The report concluded that U.S. immigration 
policy was based on five broad goals, which included family reunification, preventing 
illegal immigration, protecting human rights, increasing the standard of living and 
national productivity, and encouraging diversity (Rudolph, 2006).           
According to the findings documented in The 9/11Commission Report, the legal 
immigration system was not considered vulnerable to exploitation by terrorists prior to 
the September 11, 2001 attacks.  Enhancing its integrity was not seen as a vital 
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component of an effective homeland security strategy (National Commission, 2004).  
Most Americans generally did not consider the country to be vulnerable to foreign attack.  
The fact that the country had experienced a period of nonviolence and prosperity, shared 
borders with friendly neighbors, and was protected by two oceans contributed to this 
sense of security (Mylorie, 2001).   
The 9/11 Commission found that although there were some efforts to enhance 
border security, prior to September 11, 2001, immigration policy as a counterintelligence 
tool was utilized far too little by governmental agencies (Eldridge et al., 2004).  
Furthermore, the 9/11 Commission ascertained that no governmental agency considered 
the immigration system an essential counterterrorism measure (GAO, 2008b).  The 9/11 
Commission concluded that officials, such as consular officers abroad and immigration 
inspectors at the ports of entry, who are central to determining the admissibility of 
foreign nationals, were not considered full partners in national security or 
counterterrorism efforts.  Therefore, critical opportunities to identify and detain terrorists 
before they entered the United States were lost (Garcia & Wasem, 2008).  
Although it acknowledged that the consular officers were the first layer of defense 
in terms of border security, the Department of State (DOS) resisted the concept that it 
was responsible for identifying terrorists through the interview process during the 1990s 
(Eldridge et al., 2004).  There were individuals within the agency that expressed concerns 
regarding the growing terrorist threat.  For example, in 1997, Mary Ryan, the Assistant 
Secretary for DOS’s Bureau of Consular Affairs stated in congressional testimony that 
“while the majority of consular fraud is committed to further illegal immigration, there 
are significant and rising threats against the integrity of our travel documents from 
organized criminals, drug traffickers and terrorists” (Visa Fraud, 1997, p. 7).  Despite 
these concerns, between 1993 and 2001, DOS visa screening efforts focused primarily on 
determining whether the applicant was an intending immigrant, or someone planning to 
overstay their visa and remain in the United States illegally (Eldridge et al., 2004).   
Terrorist travel practices were not a major focus for consular officers.  The State 
Department did not increase training in detecting terrorists for consular officers.  In fact, 
they were not trained on how to ascertain whether an individual had terrorist or criminal 
 6
connections or to detect if the individual attempted to use fraudulent document practices 
known to be linked to terrorism.  Consular officers were instructed to rely on name-based 
checks of terrorist watch lists.  Confronted with demands to improve customer service 
and increase productivity, DOS heavily relied on technology and the use of name checks 
through watch lists to prevent terrorist from obtaining visas.  Officials within DOS 
operated under the assumption that the intelligence community would provide terrorist 
information on watch lists.  However, no law required that this information be shared 
with DOS.  The aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks and the realization that 
Sheik Rahman was successfully able to obtain a visa despite being included on a watch 
list caused DOS to reevaluate its counterterrorism efforts (Eldridge et al., 2004).   
Similarly, the nexus between immigration and terrorism was not fully appreciated 
by some individuals within INS.  On October 17, 2001, INS Commissioner James Ziglar 
stated during testimony before the immigration subcommittee, “immigrants are not 
terrorists…The people we are talking about, the hijackers; they weren’t immigrants.  
They were nonimmigrants” (Camarota, 2002b, p. 19).  However, there were individuals 
within the INS that expressed concerns over terrorists manipulating the legal immigration 
system prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks.  For example, in May 1999, the Acting 
Executive Associate Commission for the Immigration Services Division within INS 
testified: 
…immigration benefit fraud had increased in both scope and complexity 
in recent years and that exploitation of the benefit petition process by 
criminals and criminal organizations had generated serious concerns.  He 
stated that criminal aliens and terrorists manipulate the benefit application 
process to facilitate expansion of their illegal activities, such as crimes of 
violence, narcotics trafficking, terrorism, and entitlement fraud. (GAO, 
2002, p. 12)   
Despite the concerns expressed by some individuals within the agency, the INS 
generally did not consider the immigration system a mechanism to detect terrorist activity 
prior to September 11, 2001 (Eldridge et al., 2004).  The Staff Report of the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States stated that the INS’s, “inability 
to adjudicate applications quickly or with adequate security checks made it easier for 
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terrorists to wrongfully enter and remain in the United States throughout the 1990s” 
(Eldridge et al., 2004, p. 99).  The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 as amended 
provided the INS with the:    
…statutory responsibility to determine who may enter, who may remain, 
and who must be removed from the United States.  However, neither INS 
leadership nor any other entity in government ever fully recognized that 
within INS’ overall responsibility to determine admission for all travelers 
was an important responsibility to exclude and remove terrorists, a task 
that no other agency could perform.  The failure of the INS to recognize 
the value of its immigration authority in identifying and removing 
terrorists was manifested throughout the agency.  It stemmed from a 
general lack of a counterterrorism strategy. (Eldridge et al., 2004, p. 142)   
Similar to visa processing procedures overseas, inspections at the ports of entry 
were typically viewed as a means to facilitate travel.  Immigration inspectors were under 
significant pressure to process travelers quickly.  Often, they did not have adequate 
training or the tools to do their job properly (Eldridge et al., 2004).  Inspectors were 
primarily focused on identifying intending immigrants, drug couriers and criminals, all of 
which were linked to the use of fraudulent documents.  They were not provided 
information regarding terrorist indicators in travel documents that could have enabled 
them to recognize the indicators present in some of the 9/11 hijackers’ passports.  
Inspectors were provided general information and routinely reviewed documents for 
general document fraud.  However, they did not routinely inspect them for terrorist 
alterations and indicators (Eldridge et al., 2004).  After the 1993 World Trade Center 
bombing, individuals began to express a growing fear of international terrorism.  The 
1993 bombings and subsequent plots revealed that procedural problems with the 
immigration system, inadequate verification of information provided in support of 
applications or petitions, outdated technology and inadequate information sharing existed 
(Jenkins, 1993).   
2. The Post September 11, 2001 Environment  
Based on the literature reviewed, it appears that since the attacks of September 11, 
2001, the reality that foreign terrorists seek to exploit loopholes in the international travel 
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system to facilitate the planning and implementation of attacks against the United States 
has become clearer.  Conflict is no longer as narrowly defined as interactions between 
national armies for defense.  Security concerns are framed in terms of the threat of global 
terrorism, which represented a new type of asymmetrical threat.  The fact that the 
terrorists involved were able to manipulate the immigration system to infiltrate the 
country highlighted the danger of this new security threat and the connection between 
immigration and security (Rudolph, 2006).   
The lessons learned from that event have illustrated the importance of improving 
the monitoring and control of terrorist travel as a means of constraining their activities.  
In order to carry out an attack, foreign terrorists must successfully enter the country first 
(National Counterterrorism Center, 2006).  The events of September 11, 2001 contributed 
to the realization that “global terrorism has emerged as a central security issue the world 
over; and effective immigration and border control have become necessary conditions to 
maintain national security.  That national security and control of international migration 
are linked is now conventional wisdom.  Less recognized, however, is the fact that 
migration and national security have been strongly linked long before September 11 and 
the emergence of the global terror threat” (Rudolph, 2006, p. 2).  
However, some of the literature reflects that even in the post September 11, 2001 
environment, there are some that question the “securitization” of immigration (Rudolph, 
2006).  There was one point of view that reflected the belief that immigration 
enforcement was not an effective means to combat terrorist or other criminal activity.  
Rather, traditional law enforcement and intelligence efforts were the only effective means 
to prevent foreign nationals who entered the country legally from engaging in criminal 
activities.  Immigration procedures should be relied upon to regulate admission into and 
exit from the country.  They were not designed for use in criminal investigations or for 
gathering intelligence (Bali, 2003).  According to this perspective, the portrayal that with 
increases in the numbers of border security agents and enhanced authority to deport 
foreign nationals increases security creates a false sense of security.  Immigration reform 
will not and cannot prevent individuals with criminal intent from entering the country no 
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matter how restrictive the policy, nor will it prevent the recruitment and radicalization of 
native born or naturalized citizens (Demleitner, 2002).   
Furthermore, there were concerns raised regarding the potential impact that the 
misuse of the legal immigration system can have on civil liberties (Bali, 2003).  
Advocates who seek to increase support for more open immigration policies have raised 
concerns about establishing links between immigration and national security.  They fear 
that this will be used as justification to impose more restrictive immigration policies 
(Rudolph, 2006).   
Although the literature pertaining to the post September 11, 2001 environment 
indicates that there is general agreement that enhancing border security, strengthening the 
legal immigration system and constraining terrorist mobility are critical aspects of 
protecting homeland security, there is no consensus as to how to achieve these goals.  
The existing literature offers a variety of perspectives on how to approach immigration 
reform and the mechanisms needed to mitigate vulnerabilities to enhance security.  For 
example, Susan Martin and Philip Martin state, “Immigration policy changes cannot 
prevent terrorism, but they are key ingredients of the effort to combat terrorism” (2004, p. 
329).  They outline three areas where they feel improvements are needed.  These areas 
include preventing terrorist mobility, prosecuting individuals suspected to be terrorists 
and protecting the rights of individuals who have been unfairly accused of being 
terrorists.  Although not specifically related to preventing terrorists from entering the 
country, they also identify four main areas in immigration policies where changes could 
enhance efforts to counter terrorist travel.  These areas include: improving the visa 
issuance process and border inspections; better mechanisms for tracking foreign nationals 
once they have entered the country; reducing unauthorized entries and increasing interior 
enforcement (Martin & Martin, 2004). 
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) concluded that legacy INS, now 
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), must improve its 
technological capabilities in order improve its ability to identify fraud schemes prior to 
granting a benefit.  Furthermore, the GAO recommended that immigration officials need 
to balance the duel objectives of detecting and deterring fraud and timely processing 
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immigration benefit applications; establish guidance for prioritizing immigration fraud 
investigations; track immigration benefit fraud investigations; determine the best method 
of providing adjudicators with access to internal databases and establish outcome-based 
performance metrics (2002). 
The 9/11 Commission concluded:  
Targeting travel is at least as powerful a weapon against terrorists as 
targeting their money.  The United States should combine terrorist travel 
intelligence, operations, and law enforcement in a strategy to intercept 
terrorists, find terrorist travel facilitators, and constrain terrorist mobility. 
(National Commission, 2004, p. 385) 
One of the most important measures to constrain terrorist mobility and reduce the 
nation’s vulnerability is to enhance technology and increase training to detect terrorist 
travel documents (National Commission, 2004).   
The National Strategy to Combat Terrorist Travel (NSCTT) was drafted to guide 
the nation’s efforts to constrain terrorists’ mobility.  The NSCTT is based on the 
assumption that constraining terrorist mobility will diminish their capacity to operate and 
engage in acts of terrorism.  In order to prevent terrorists from exploiting international 
travel, the government must work closely with its foreign allies to utilize and expand 
existing tools to collect and analyze information on terrorist travel and enhance screening 
and information sharing initiatives regarding their travel patterns.  NSCTT offers 
recommendations to further enhance the nation’s ability to constrain terrorist mobility 
overseas and to help prevent terrorists from entering, exiting or traveling within the 
country.  These recommendations include activities such as:  
• Continuing to work with foreign governments to develop identity 
verification systems aimed at detecting and intercepting high-risk 
travelers; 
• Working with Canada to examine the feasibility of developing and 
implementing compatible systems and procedures to screen individuals 
traveling between the two countries; 
• Encouraging foreign leaders to implement or enhance laws that 
criminalize counterfeiting, altering or misusing travel or identity 
documents;  
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• Implementing pre-departure Advance Passenger Information System to 
improve the ability to vet travelers;  
• Expanding efforts to enhance border control and combat immigration 
fraud through initiatives such as the Secure Border Initiative and 
increasing the number of actionable leads to Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) and the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) 
through development of increased analytical capabilities (National 
Counterterrorism Center, 2006). 
Although several recommendations were identified, the majority of the literature 
failed to include in-depth analysis on how terrorists have been able to successfully obtain 
immigration benefits or why their fraudulent claims were not identified.  The existing 
research also provided little analysis that identified broader patterns or trends in order to 
determine how terrorists were able to manipulate the immigration system.  Although the 
majority of the documents offered general recommendations for enhancing border 
security, there were few significant recommendations for programmatic, legislative or 
regulatory changes to immigration policy that would prevent terrorists from fraudulently 
obtaining benefits.   
Furthermore, despite the availability of considerable information gathered through 
numerous investigations: 
…no agency of the U.S. government undertook what was so desperately 
needed: a comprehensive analysis of how terrorists exploit weaknesses in 
travel documents and international travel channels to commit deadly 
attacks.  In practical terms, this meant the United States denied itself the 
ability to disrupt terrorist operations and prevent undetected terrorist 
entries by disrupting operatives’ ability to travel. (Eldridge et al., 2004, p. 
69) 
The 9/11 Commission found that if this analysis had been conducted, it would 
have uncovered ways in which terrorists had been systematically exploiting weaknesses 
in the legal immigration system since the early 1990s (National Commission, 2004).  It is 
crucial to analyze cases of proven fraud to determine interrelationships or patterns among 
these cases.  This analysis will help to identify and remove the loopholes that 
compromise the integrity of the legal immigration system that have been exploited by 
terrorists.  Additional emphasis needs to be placed on identifying the mechanisms needed 
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to detect the systemic vulnerabilities in the legal immigration system that have been 
exploited by terrorists and the requisite solutions.   
C. PURPOSE OF RESEARCH 
This thesis will investigate the nexus between immigration and terrorism. The 
research will also seek to identify the loopholes in the legal immigration system exploited 
by foreign terrorists and the long-term solutions necessary to eliminate the systemic 
vulnerabilities.  This research includes instances where the foreign national did not 
commit immigration fraud at the time of initial entry but subsequently overstayed his or 
her visa or violated the terms and conditions of their status.  For example, under 
immigration law, engaging in terrorist related activity has direct consequences in relation 
to a person’s ability to enter or remain in the country.  Prior to September 11, 2001, any 
foreign national who engaged in terrorism or was a member or representative of a 
terrorist organization was considered inadmissible.  A foreign national who was legally 
admitted into the country but subsequently engages in terrorist activity is subject to 
deportation (Garcia & Wasem, 2008).  Therefore, “all those who engage or intend to 
engage in terrorist activity upon entry into the United States have committed fraud under 
U.S. immigration law” (Kephart, 2005, p. 10).  This reality makes the task of border 
security and visa screening more difficult.  In addition to searching for indicators of 
fraud, border security officials must also search for indications of terrorist intent and 
experience. 
However, since it is outside the scope of the study, this research will not evaluate 
the threat that domestic terrorist represents to the safety and security of the country nor 
will it evaluate the issue of whether there are immigrants who enter legally and 
subsequently become radicalized inside the United States.  Strengthening the legal 
immigration system is not the most effective mechanism to address domestic threats or 
the radicalization of foreign nationals once they have entered the country.   
Although enhancing border security is paramount to winning the War on Terror, 
“the border and immigration system of the United States must remain a visible 
manifestation of our belief in freedom, democracy, global economic growth, and the rule 
of law, yet serve equally well as a vital element of counterterrorism” (National 
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Commission 2004, p. 387).  Reforms to the immigration system must effectively balance 
the duel objectives of enhancing integrity and maintaining an open immigration system.  
Although this researcher acknowledges the need to maintain the balance between security 
and the protection of civil liberties, the purpose of this thesis is to identify the weaknesses 
in the immigration system and the improvements needed in the enforcement of 
immigration law.  Therefore, how to maintain this balance will not be addressed within 
the context of this study. 
Key questions to be addressed include: How have foreign terrorists exploited 
loopholes in the legal immigration system in order to gain admission into or remain in the 
country; are there systemic vulnerabilities in the legal immigration system that enable 
foreign terrorists to engage in immigration fraud and what policy, procedural, operational 
or legislative changes can be implemented to mitigate risks?  The evidence required is a 
detailed analysis of the immigration histories of known foreign terrorists who have 
manipulated or attempted to manipulate the legal immigration system in order to enter 
and operate in the United States.   The analysis will show that rather than focus on one 
benefit category or manner of entry, terrorist operatives will utilize all means available in 
order to gain admission into or remain in the country.  Therefore in today’s global 
environment, “immigration and security are indivisible—weakness in any aspect of 
immigration enforcement can and will be exploited” (Krikorian, 2007, p. 1).  The 
recommendations provided to mitigate the vulnerabilities identified through the analysis 
of the case studies will focus on all facets of the immigration system and apply a holistic 
approach to identifying the necessary reforms and seek to identify vulnerabilities not 
directly related to the benefit application process but help facilitate terrorist mobility.   
This research is primarily intended for senior leaders within the United States 
Citizenship and Immigration Services.  Because this research seeks to identify the 
systemic vulnerabilities in the legal immigration system and propose solutions, USCIS 
may be able to implement changes to prevent terrorists from obtaining immigration 
benefits through illicit means and therefore minimize their opportunity to engage in 
criminal activities in the country.  However, this research also has a broader audience, 
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II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE IMMIGRATION 
SYSTEM AND IMMIGRATION FRAUD 
A. THE UNITED STATES LEGAL IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: 
HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Before an analysis of how the immigration system has been exploited can be 
conducted, it is important to understand the basic elements that make up the system and 
how it functions.  The legal immigration system is based on a set of administrative and 
legal procedures that regulate the entry and departure of foreign nationals into the country 
(Bali, 2003).  Immigration policy is designed to facilitate the entry of legitimate foreign 
nationals into the country while simultaneously identifying and preventing foreign 
nationals who pose a threat to safety and security from gaining admission (Martin & 
Martin, 2004).  Global security concerns, economic factors and changing demographic 
trends have influenced recent increases in migration.  This trend has created new 
challenges for the countries of origin, transit and resettlement, such as the strain that it 
can place on job markets and social infrastructure. These strains become even more 
pronounced when humanitarian programs like family reunification and asylum are 
involved (Brinkmann, 2004).   
The General Accounting Office (GAO) documented in a report issued in January 
2002 that “the goal of providing immigration benefits in a timely manner to those who 
are legally entitled to them may conflict with the goal of preserving the integrity of the 
legal immigration system” (GAO 2002, p. 5).  Since the tragic events of September 11, 
2001, many have questioned whether or not the current legal immigration system is able 
to balance these two objectives (Martin and Martin, 2004).  Immigration officials in the 
United States believe that individuals have used the benefit application process in this 
country to provide them the means to further engage in illegal activities such as terrorism, 
violent crimes or trafficking narcotics (GAO, 2002).   
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The September 11, 2001 attacks highlighted the flaws in the immigration system.  
The conspirators involved:  
…depended on the ability of the hijackers to obtain visas and pass an 
immigration and customs inspection in order to enter the United States.  It 
also depended on their ability to remain here undetected while they 
worked out the operational details of the attack.  If they had failed on 
either count—entering and becoming embedded—the plot could not have 
been executed. (Eldridge et al., 2004, p. 2)   
Analysis of the immigration history of the terrorists involved in the plot revealed 
that all of them committed some form of immigration fraud (National Commission, 
2004).  All 19 of the hijackers entered the country using a temporary nonimmigrant visa, 
and 16 of the terrorists involved were still in a legal status when the attacks occurred 
(Camarota, 2002b).  Some of the hijackers overstayed their visas, in violation of 
immigration laws (Leiken, 2004).  Once they gained admission into the country, two of 
the terrorists violated the terms of their visas.  One of the hijackers entered the country on 
a student visa but failed to attend school. Another entered on a tourist visa but 
immediately enrolled in flight school (Eldridge et al., 2004).  Illegal Salvadorian 
immigrants provided at least two of the hijackers with fraudulent documents.  Zacharias 
Moussaoui, a second generation French Moroccan, exploited his status to enter the 
United States without a visa under the Visa Waiver Program3 (Leiken, 2004).       
The 9/11 Commission also found that 15 of the 19 terrorists involved in the 
attacks were potentially vulnerable to interception at the port of entry (National 
Commission, 2004).  Three of the terrorists’ involved possessed passports that had 
indicators of Islamist extremist linked to al Qaeda.  Two of the 19 hijackers entered the 
country using passports that had been manipulated in a fraudulent manner.  The passports 
contained fraudulent entry-exit stamps, which were most likely inserted to hide 
suspicious travel.  Two of the individuals provided false statements on their visa 
applications but ultimately were not questioned about those discrepancies.  Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammed, a Pakistani national and the chief tactical planner for the attacks, applied for 
                                                 
3
 This program enables citizens of participating countries to travel to United States for business or 
tourism to enter without a visa and remain for a period of up to 90 days (Eldridge et al., 2004). 
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and obtained a visitor’s visa using a Saudi passport under an assumed name.  Because he 
used an alias, he was able to obtain the visa despite the fact that he was listed on the 
terrorist watch list since 19964 (Eldridge et al., 2004).     
The 9/11 Commission concluded that if the legal immigration system had: 
…set a higher bar for determining whether individuals are who or what 
they claim to be—and ensuring routine consequences for violations—it 
could potentially have excluded, removed, or come into further contact 
with several hijackers who did not appear to meet the terms for admitting 
short-term visitors. (National Commission, 2004, p. 384) 
In total, the 19 terrorists involved in the attacks came into contact with consular 
officers 25 times and immigration and customs authorities 43 times.  Over a period of 21 
months, they were able to enter the United States 33 times through nine different ports of 
entry.  The apparent ease with which the terrorists were able to obtain visas and freely 
enter the United States illustrates the importance of travel mobility to terrorist operations 
(Eldridge et al., 2004).      
Routine procedures created to administer and enforce immigration laws, including 
aspects not directly designed to detect terrorist threats, influenced al Qaeda’s operational 
planning for the attacks.  The Staff Report of the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks upon the United States on 9/11 and Terrorist Travel determined that because 
immigration regulations automatically granted tourists a six-month period of admission, 
obtaining tourist visas to enter the country was important to the hijackers (Eldridge, et al. 
2004).  The 14 hijackers who were admitted in the spring and early summer of 2001 were 
legally permitted to remain in the country until September 11.  This six-month period of 
admission provided the hijackers adequate time to make preparations for the attack 
(Eldridge, et al. 2004).   
The mere ability to obtain a visa to enter the U.S. also played a significant part in 
the preparing for these attacks (National Commission, 2004).  The fact that 15 of the 19 
terrorists involved in the September 11, 2001 attacks were Saudis can be linked to the 
ease with which they could obtain visas.  In contrast, Yemeni nationals had a 66 percent 
                                                 
4
 There is no evidence that he used this visa to enter the country (Eldridge et al., 2004). 
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refusal rate for tourist visas in fiscal year 1999 (Eldridge et al., 2004).  Furthermore, five 
known conspirators attempted to obtain nonimmigrant student or tourist visas to enter the 
United States.  Because they were not deemed to be bona fide non-immigrants, their 
applications were denied.  An additional conspirator was able to obtain a visa but was 
denied by the immigration inspector at the port of entry (National Commission, 2004).  
This provides evidence that the inability to travel can interrupt the operational plans of 
terrorists (Eldridge et al., 2004).   
Constraining terrorist mobility is now described as “one of the most effective 
weapons in the War on Terror.  Limiting their movements markedly diminishes terrorists’ 
ability to attack the United States, our interests abroad, or our allies” (National 
Counterterrorism Center, 2006, p. 1).  Since terrorists must travel in order to meet, gain 
access to their target, plan their attack and conduct surveillance on their target, they must 
utilize travel documents to facilitate movement in and out of the country (National 
Commission, 2004).  Travel documents are as important to terrorists as the weapons used 
in their operations (Kephart, 2005).  High-level al Qaeda operatives are believed to be 
experts in forging documents.  They actively train recruits, including Mohammed Atta, in 
forging techniques (Eldridge et al., 2004).  Because they are key tools that facilitate 
terrorist travel, decreasing terrorists’ access to travel documents and increasing the ability 
to detect fraudulent documents is critical to the nation’s efforts to combat terrorism.  
Additionally, strengthening the security features of travel documents limits terrorists’ 
ability to use forged copies of legitimate documents.  Denying foreign terrorists entry into 
the country also significantly reduces the problem of having to locate them after they 
have been admitted (National Counterterrorism Center, 2006).   
B. OVERVIEW OF THE LAYERS WITHIN THE LEGAL IMMIGRATION 
SYSTEM 
There are various entities involved in administering the multiple layered 
immigration control system.  The first layer consists of the United States Citizenship and 
Immigration Services and Department of State (DOS) Bureau of Consular Affairs 
(Krikorian, 2004).  Consular officers stationed at posts overseas are responsible for 
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processing visa applications.  USCIS is responsible for processing approximately six 
million applications and petitions for immigration benefits filed with the agency every 
year (DHS OIG, 2008).  DOS and USCIS are responsible for verifying the identities, 
conducting background checks and ensuring eligibility for the individuals seeking visas 
or the adjudication of immigration benefits (Wasem, 2008).  The type of immigration 
benefits available range from applications for temporary nonimmigrant visas, 
employment authorization, political asylum, legal permanent residence and naturalization 
(GAO, 2002).   
The next layer occurs at the port of entry when the individual presents him or 
herself for inspection (Kirkorian, 2004).  Customs and Border Protection plays a crucial 
role in securing the border by conducting inspections of foreign nationals seeking 
admission at the ports of entry (Wasem, 2008).  Enforcement of immigration laws at the 
ports of entry has been successfully used to deny terrorists entry into the county.  For 
example, in December 1999, Ahmed Ressam attempted to enter the country using a 
forged Canadian passport under the assumed identity of Benni Norris (Rudolph, 2006).  
Ressam traveled to Canada in 1994.  He subsequently applied for asylum, but Canadian 
authorities denied his application.  Despite several arrests, Canadian authorities did not 
deport him.  He obtained a Canadian driver’s license and passport under a false name by 
using a forged baptismal certificate (Martin & Martin, 2004).  When he attempted to 
enter the United States from Canada, he had a car full of explosives he was intending to 
use to during the millennium celebrations in Seattle and for an attack on Los Angeles 
International Airport.  He was detained when the inspector at the port of entry observed 
some suspicious behavior (Kirkorian & Camarota, 2001).   
The final layer involves interior enforcement of immigration laws after the 
individual has already been admitted (Kirkorian, 2004).  Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) has primary responsibility for interior enforcement and criminal 
investigations of immigration fraud (Wasem, 2008).  This aspect is the most problematic 
given the difficulty in finding and removing an individual that has already been admitted.  
Without effective controls to track departures, it is nearly impossible to determine who 
has overstayed the authorized period of admission and remained in the country illegally.  
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Several of the terrorists involved in attacks that have occurred in the United States 
overstayed their visas.  Many of these individuals were able to live, work, open bank 
accounts and obtain drivers’ licenses, despite the fact that they did not have valid 
immigration status.  Because several terrorists have violated immigration law after they 
were legally admitted, effective interior enforcement is a crucial aspect of preventing or 
disrupting terrorist plots (Kirkorian, 2004). 
The fact that there are multiple layers and entities involved in administering the 
legal immigration system adds to the complexity in detecting fraudulent activity and 
enforcing compliance with existing laws.  It becomes progressively more difficult to 
remove or exclude an individual with each successive layer (Krikorian, 2004).  
Understanding this complexity is necessary in order to realize the importance of talking a 
holistic approach when analyzing how terrorists have been able to successfully 
manipulate the legal immigration system.  Without this understanding, critical areas 
could be overlooked during the analysis.   
C. DEFINING IMMIGRATION FRAUD 
Generally, immigration fraud is divided into two broad categories, document 
fraud and benefit fraud.  Document fraud involves the use, production or sale of altered 
or forged documents.  Generally, these documents include identity documents, alien 
registration documents, employment authorizations, passports, visas or any other 
document needed to support an application or petition for an immigration benefit 
(Wasem, 2008).  Document fraud can also involve attempts to fraudulently obtain 
legitimate documents through vendors who sell counterfeit documents or corrupt 
immigration officials who sell legitimate documents or falsify official records.  
Fraudulent documents are used as evidence for employment eligibility or to obtain other 
benefits like drivers’ licenses or social security cards (Visa Fraud, 1997).  Investigations 
into counterfeit document rings are important because terrorist organizations, crime 
syndicates and alien smuggling rings rely on these documents to avoid detection.  The 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides civil enforcement provisions for 
individuals who have committed immigration document fraud.  Under U.S. Criminal 
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Code, knowingly producing, using or facilitating the production of fraudulent 
immigration documents is a criminal offence (Wasem, 2008). 
In a study it conducted on the Department of Homeland Security’s ability to 
control fraud, the GAO identified several types of fraudulent documents used by 
individuals seeking benefits for which they were not eligible.  These documents included 
birth certificates, marriage certificates, financial documents, college transcripts and 
employee resumes (GAO, 2006).  The fact that at least seven of the terrorists involved in 
the September 11, 2001 attacks were able to obtain valid Virginia drivers’ licenses by 
submitting fraudulent residency certificates illustrates the threat that document fraud 
presents (U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement [ICE], 2006a).       
Benefit fraud involves the misrepresentation or falsification of a material fact in 
order to obtain an immigration benefit or status such as citizenship, legal permanent 
resident status or temporary nonimmigrant visas through illicit means.  Often benefit 
fraud is viewed in conjunction with other crimes since individuals frequently will create 
or procure fraudulent documents in order to establish eligibility for an immigration 
benefit.  The Immigration and Nationality Act prohibits the misrepresentation of a 
material fact or falsely claiming to be a U.S. citizen.  Individuals who have engaged in 
these activities are inadmissible or subject to removal (Wasem, 2008).   
The incentives to commit benefit fraud are easy to understand.  It allows an 
ineligible individual the opportunity to obtain legitimate immigration documents.  
Therefore, he or she does not need to rely on fraudulent or counterfeit documents in order 
to live and work in the United States.  Once the individual obtains a legitimate 
immigration document, it is unlikely the fraud will be detected (Visa Fraud, 1997).  
Because immigration benefits such as permanent residence, citizenship or employment 
authorization are so valuable, illegal aliens, criminals and terrorists consider them to be 
highly valuable and are willing to pay substantial amounts of money to obtain them (ICE, 
2006a).   
Because it covers such a wide range of benefit programs, combating fraud 
presents serious challenges.  In addition to the wide variety of benefit programs subject to 
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fraudulent claims, the significant volume of applications or petitions that can be included 
in one scheme present additional challenges (Branigin, 1997).  Investigations are labor 
intensive and can involve hundreds to thousands of applications and petitions (Visa 
Fraud, 1997).  One case involving a major criminal conspiracy involved approximately 
50 percent of the applications filed by a particular immigration consulting firm for illegal 
aliens, applying under the amnesty provisions enacted during the 1980s, were suspected 
or proven to be fraudulent.  The 54 individuals who were prosecuted for the scheme had 
collected over $9 million in fees (Branigin, 1997).         
In January 2002, the Government Accountability Office found that legacy INS did 
not have a comprehensive strategy for combating benefit fraud and did not have a 
mechanism to collect or report data regarding the amount of fraud that exists.  Efforts to 
combat benefit fraud were disorganized and tended to focus on large-scale conspiracies.  
Without quantifiable data on how pervasive the problem was, the agency did not have the 
means to appropriately direct resources to combat immigration benefit fraud (GAO, 
2002).  In March 2006, the GAO completed a review on immigration benefit fraud and 
concluded that although the full extent of the problem is unknown, immigration fraud is a 
pervasive problem (GAO, 2006).  The Department of Homeland Security Office of 
Immigration Statistics reported that indictments for immigration fraud increased from 
709 in fiscal year 2004 to 1,032 in fiscal year 2006.  During that same timeframe, 
convictions for immigration fraud increased from 533 to 1,073 (Wasem, 2008).         
D. COMMON TYPES OF IMMIGRATION FRAUD 
Immigration benefit fraud involves diverse schemes and can include scenarios 
such as an individual filing multiple applications under various aliases in the hopes that 
one of the applications will get approved.  It can also include providing material 
misrepresentations on applications or petitions to give the appearance of eligibility or 
hide derogatory information such as prior criminal history that would make the individual 
ineligible for the benefit sought (Kephart, 2005).  Examples of benefit fraud included 
entering into a sham marriage, fraudulent claims of political persecution, the omission of 
a disqualifying criminal history and falsely claiming to have lived in the United States for 
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the requisite time required for the benefit (Wasem, 2008).  It can also involve the creation 
of fictitious companies or jobs for the foreign national beneficiary (Visa Fraud, 1997).   
One of the most common avenues available to remain in the country is marriage 
to a U.S. citizen.  This provides the foreign national an avenue towards legal permanent 
residence and, ultimately, citizenship (Kephart, 2005).  The number of individuals who 
have obtained legal permanent resident status through marriage to an American citizen 
has more than doubled since 1985 and quadrupled since 1970 (Seminara, 2008).  
Between 1998 and 2007, over 2.3 million foreign nationals obtained legal permanent 
resident status based on marriage to an American citizen (Seminara, 2008).  In 2007, 
foreign spouses of U.S. citizens comprised of 25 percent of all individuals granted legal 
permanent resident status (Seminara, 2008).  Approximately twice as many individuals 
were granted permanent resident status based on a marriage based petition filed by an 
American citizen than based on an employment-based petition filed by a company 
seeking to employ a foreign worker (Seminara, 2008).   
The immediate relative of a U.S. citizen category, which includes spouse, parents 
and children under the age of 21, is the only immigrant classification that is not subject to 
numerical limitations (Seminara, 2008).  Because they are subject to numerical 
limitations, the waiting period for some other classifications can be over 15 years.  
Additionally, marriage to a United States citizen provides a faster avenue to 
naturalization.  These individuals can apply for citizenship three years after obtaining 
permanent resident status, rather than the standard five-year period (S. Rep 99-325, 
1986).  Once an individual obtains legal permanent resident status or citizen, he or she 
can freely travel in and out of the country (GAO, 2008b).       
Despite the fact that the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments Act of 1986 
provides for a maximum penalty of a $250,000 fine and 5 years in prison for individuals 
convicted of engaging in a fraudulent marriage for the purposes of obtaining an 
immigration benefit, marriage fraud is a common form of immigration benefit fraud.  
Marriage fraud can take a variety of forms.  One of the most common scenarios involves 
the American citizen receiving payment in order to marry the foreign national.  The fees 
typically range from $5,000 to $10,000 but can be as high as $20,000 (Seminara, 2008).  
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Other types of marriage fraud schemes include cases where the American citizen is doing 
a favor for a friend or family member, the foreign national fools the citizen into believing 
it is a legitimate relationship and situations where the American citizen marries the 
foreign national with the intention of exploiting or trafficking him or her in some way 
(Seminara, 2008).   
Additionally, among the various applications and petitions processed by USCIS, 
religious worker visas have been considered extremely problematic in terms of 
immigration fraud (Kephart, 2005).  Under this program, foreign nationals can obtain 
nonimmigrant visas or permanent resident status if a religious organization files a petition 
to sponsor them (ICE, 2006b).  In 1999, GAO conducted a study and found that INS 
could not quantify the extent of fraud in this visa category.  The study found that the 
nature of the fraud included misrepresentations regarding the beneficiaries’ qualifications 
or the nature of the position offered (Kephart, 2005).   Both DOS and INS have expressed 
concern regarding individuals and organizations exploiting the religious worker program 
to enable ineligible individuals to obtain entry or remain in the country.  The agencies 
were able to broadly identify that fraud was typically committed in this program by 
individuals misrepresenting their qualifications as a religious worker; the length of time 
the individual has been a member of the organization or the true nature of the job duties.  
Neither agency at that time had data to reflect the extent of problem, nor had they 
conducted analysis on how much fraud was committed.  Any information regarding fraud 
within the religious worker program was based on previous investigations or the visa 
screening process (GAO, 1999).   
In 2005, USCIS conducted a benefit fraud assessment to determine the nature and 
amount of fraud in the immigrant religious worker classification (GAO, 2008b).  The 
study was based on a random sample of cases.  Out of the 220 cases included in the 
study, 78 or 33 percent were found to be fraudulent (Savage, 2006).  Problems discovered 
included non-existent organizations, organizations with no indication of functioning as a 
religious institution and misrepresentations regarding the beneficiary’s prior experience 
or job duties (Savage, 2006).  The report also found high fraud rates among petitions filed 
on behalf of individuals from special interest countries and raised concerns regarding the 
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potential link to terrorism.  There were 11 petitions included in the study filed on behalf 
of nationals from special interest countries, eight of which were found to be fraudulent.  
For example, one case included in the study involved an organization that petitioned for a 
Pakistani national.  When the officers attempted to visit the organization, they found it 
was an apartment complex rather than a mosque.  In addition, watch list information 
revealed that the address provided had been used by individuals suspected of being 
members of a terrorist organization (Savage, 2006).    
Finally, fraud in the asylum program also has been an attractive avenue for 
terrorists to exploit for several reasons.  Generally, asylum claims are based on the oral 
and written testimony of the applicant.  Because corroborating evidence is not required, 
fraudulent asylum claims can be easy to make.  Even if the application is ultimately 
denied, the individual is able to remain in the country while the case is being reviewed.  
An individual claiming asylum is automatically protected against removal.  Furthermore, 
due to lack of detention space, applicants are frequently released unless they present a 
risk to public safety (Kephart, 2005).  As a result, fraudulent “political asylum claims 
usually permit terrorist to do what they seek: buy time to live here freely” (Kephart, 
2005, p. 26). 
Foreign-born terrorists have manipulated these and other immigration benefit 
programs because they need operatives who have the ability to enter and reside in the 
country in order to carry out an attack.  The interconnected relationship between the legal 
immigration system and terrorism has been clearer since the attacks of September 11, 
2001.  As evidenced by those attacks, terrorists have easily exploited the legal 
immigration system in order to gain access to the country.  They have taken advantage of 
almost every benefit category and committed numerous violations of immigration law.  
The following chapter will analyze the immigration histories of the foreign-born terrorists 
involved in four plots in order to ascertain how they were able to successfully manipulate 
the immigration system and avoid detection.   
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III. CASE STUDIES OF TERRORISTS THAT HAVE EXPLOITED 
THE LEGAL IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 
On September 11, 2001, over 3,000 individuals were killed and approximately 
2,300 additional individuals were injured in the attacks on the World Trade Center and 
the Pentagon (Kephart, 2005).  Although they were the most destructive, they were not 
the first attacks carried out by foreign terrorists living in the United States (Camarota, 
2002b).  One of key aspects of foreign born terrorists’ operational and tactical planning is 
gaining access to the United States.  In order to carry out an attack, the terrorist must use 
the legal immigration system to facilitate travel.  Therefore, immigration enforcement can 
provide a powerful counterterrorism tool.  If their ability to travel is constricted, their 
ability to execute an attack is diminished.  Additionally, criminal violations of 
immigration law have been used to prosecute terrorists, including the terrorists involved 
in the September 11, 2001 attacks.  Law enforcement and intelligence agencies relied on 
information provided by immigration officials to locate the September 11, 2001 terrorists 
and their known associates.  For example, immigration violations were used as the basis 
to arrest and detain Zacarias Moussaoui (War on Terrorism, 2003).   
Because no existing single system can provide comprehensive security, a multi-
layered approach should be adopted for identifying and screening individuals who pose a 
threat to homeland security.  Immigration reform is merely one component of the overall 
strategy to protect national security (War on Terrorism, 2003).  Although immigration 
reform alone cannot prevent terrorism, it can help increase the possibility that their 
activities will be detected and disrupted.  It may also help provide a valuable source of 
intelligence leads.  Unfortunately, no amount of policy change or reforms will completely 
eliminate the possibility that terrorists will successfully evade detection.  However, 
policies implemented to mitigate identified vulnerabilities need not detect every attempt 
or conspirator.  The fact that some of the individuals involved are detected could be 
enough to uncover or disrupt the plot (Camarota, 2002b).   
Analysis into the immigration histories of terrorist operatives working in the 
United States may provide insight into how terrorist have been able to exploit the 
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immigration system to further their activities.  This information could help identify the 
necessary reforms needed to minimize terrorists’ ability to use the immigration system as 
a means to help facilitate their operations.  This thesis will examine the 1993 attack on 
the World Trade Center, the 1993 plot to bomb New York City landmarks, the 1998 
Embassy bombings in Africa and the 2007 plot to bomb the Fort Dix military base.  One 
study found that there were 17 successful and unsuccessful plots that involved terrorists 
with immigration violations that occurred between 1993 and 2005 (Kephart, 2005).  The 
three cases included in this study represent approximately 18 percent of the terrorist 
attacks involving immigration violations.  Although one of the examples included in this 
study falls outside this timeframe, this information provides some context regarding the 
total universe from which these cases studies were drawn. 
These case studies were chosen because they are examples of attacks or plots that 
occurred prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks and threats that occurred after those 
attacks; they consist of both successful and unsuccessful attacks or plots and they 
represent attacks or threats from foreign terrorists that occurred in the continental United 
States and ones that have occurred outside the United States but where operatives located 
within the country provided key logistical support.  The fact that the case studies are 
varied in nature should provide a more complete view of how terrorists have successfully 
manipulated the legal immigration system in order to facilitate their operational planning. 
The four case studies illustrate that terrorists have committed numerous and 
varied violations of immigration laws in order to gain admission into and remain in the 
United States (Kephart, 2005).  Almost every possible avenue available to enter and 
remain in the country was taken advantage of by the foreign-born terrorists included in 
the case studies (Camarota, 2002b).  Perhaps more alarming “is the ease with which 
terrorists have moved through U.S. border security and obtained significant immigration 
benefits, such as naturalization” (Kephart, 2005, p. 7).  The individuals involved 
exploited nonimmigrant visa classifications for students, tourists, and business visitors.  
They fraudulently obtained legal permanent resident status and became naturalized U.S. 
citizens by entering into sham marriages or falsifying employment information.  Some of 
the conspirators exploited past amnesties for illegal aliens to obtain legal permanent 
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resident status.  Even humanitarian programs such as asylum were exploited (Camarota, 
2002b).  Table 1 summarizes the various immigration benefit programs exploited by the 
17 terrorists included in the case studies. 
Table 1.   Summary of Immigration Programs Exploited by Foreign Born Terrorists  
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Additionally, the terrorists included in these case studies used a variety of tactics 
to embed themselves in the country.  These tactics include using fraudulent documents 
and false passports, using photo substituted passports, forging or altering valid or stolen 
passports, using multiple fraudulent passports and identities to facilitate travel, using 
aliases or making slight modifications to the name in order to avoid detection, providing 
false statements or information in support of applications for immigration benefits, 
overstaying the period of admission authorized pursuant to their nonimmigrant visa, 
violating the terms and conditions of admission and illegally crossing the border 
(Eldridge et al., 2004). These activities were concealed through the creation of front 
companies, false identities and travel documents and lying to authorities (Kushner, 2003).  
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Table 2 summarizes the types of tactics used by the terrorists included in the case studies 
to exploit the legal immigration system.  Similar tactics would continue to be used by al 
Qaeda in preparation for the September 11, 2001 attacks (Eldridge et al., 2004).  
Table 2.   Summary of Terrorists Tactics to Exploit the Legal Immigration System 
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The focus of this study is to evaluate how comprehensive immigration reform can 
be used as one of the tools used to combat terrorism.  Analysis of the immigration 
histories of the terrorists included in the following case studies will be used to identify 
the necessary reforms to the legal immigration system that are needed to mitigate the risk 
of exploitation by foreign born terrorists.  Although immigration reform is an important 
component of homeland security strategy, it is not the only component.  However, it is 
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outside the scope of this study to evaluate what other elements or tools should be 
included in an overall strategy to strengthen national security.   
The case study examples highlight how general weaknesses in the immigration 
system have been used to gain entry and remain in the country (Kephart, 2005).  Based 
on the analysis of the immigration histories of the terrorists included in the case studies, it 
appears that terrorists exploit general vulnerabilities in the legal immigration system.  
Their methods and techniques do not appear to differ significantly from those used by 
foreign nationals who do not pose a threat to the safety and security of the country.  The 
fact that terrorists have used a variety of techniques and exploited almost every 
immigration benefit program is important.  It highlights that any strategy implemented to 
mitigate the vulnerabilities must be multifaceted in its approach and encompasses all 
aspects of border security.  Merely focusing on one method or immigration program 
would inadequately address the problem (Camarota, 2002b).   
A. CASE STUDY 1—THE FEBRUARY 26, 1993 WORLD TRADE CENTER 
BOMBING 
At the time, the February 26, 1993 attack on the World Trade Center was 
considered the worse terrorist act committed in the United States (Kushner, 2003).  The 
1993 bombings “marked the beginning of an ugly new phase in terrorism involving the 
indiscriminate killing of civilians” (Tucker, 2000, p. 185).  The primary motive behind 
the bombings appears to have been to kill or injure as many individuals as possible.  The 
mastermind behind the plot, Ramzi Yousef, told one of the agents involved in the 
investigation that he intended the explosion to cause one of the towers to fall into the 
other and inflict over 250,000 civilian casualties (Tucker, 2000).   
The terrorists involved used a rental van to detonate 1,200 pounds of explosives in 
the basement of the south tower of the World Trade Center (Emerson, 2002). The 
explosion caused a 200 foot by 100 foot wide crater, seven stories deep, in the garage of 
the building.  The toxic smoke generated from the blast rose to the forty-sixth floor.  The 
attack resulted in 6 fatalities, over 1,000 injuries, and caused over $300 million in 
property damages (Tucker, 2000).  However, the consequences of the attack could have 
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been significantly worse.  Approximately 20,000 individuals worked at various 
businesses located in the World Trade Center complex at that time.  In addition, 
approximately another 80,000 individuals visited or traveled through the complex on a 
daily basis (Tucker, 2000).  Fortunately, the blast occurred during lunch, when many 
employees were out of the building.  Otherwise many more individuals would have likely 
been injured or killed in the attack (Reeve, 1999).     
According to the Staff Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
upon the United States, all six of the individuals convicted for their direct involvement in 
the attack received a 240 year sentence (Eldridge et al., 2004).  Another conspirator was 
also convicted in 1997 for helping his brother flee to Egypt after the attack (Camarota, 
2002b).  The perpetrators were a group of men who had been suspected on terrorism for 
more than two years (Tucker, 2000); yet many were still able to obtain immigration 
benefits in order to remain in the country.   
The summaries of the immigration histories of the terrorists involved in this attack 
included below demonstrate that better mechanisms are needed to verify an individual’s 
identity and detect fraudulent applications.  Additionally, many of the terrorists involved 
in the plot had strong connections with one another, yet those connections were not fully 
explored or detected.  Pattern and trend analysis technology designed to detect non-
obvious relationships may help the agencies responsible for administering border security 
to identify similar scenarios and prevent future attacks.  Finally, this case study 
demonstrates that better interior enforcement of immigration laws is needed to prevent 
foreign born terrorists from remaining in the country past their authorized period of 
admission.  
1. Ahmad Ajaj  
Prior to coming to the United States, evidence indicates that Palestinian national 
Ahmad Ajaj was a petty forger who created fraudulent identity documents such as 
passports and drivers’ licenses for other Islamic extremists.  He was arrested in Jerusalem 
in 1987 for running a counterfeit currency operation in a cemetery.  A year later, he was 
arrested in Jordan for document forgery (Mylroie, 2001).  He was also suspected of 
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having ties to the terrorist sections of Hamas and Al-Fatah (Tucker, 2000).  In May 1991, 
he was deported from Israel to Jordan because he was smuggling weapons into the West 
Bank.  He left Jordan to travel to the United States in September 1991 and applied for 
political asylum.  However, Ajaj failed to attend his hearing.  Even though his asylum 
application was still pending, he traveled to Pakistan in April 2002 (Mylroie, 2001).  
During this trip, he attended terrorist training in Pakistan and Afghanistan (Camarota, 
2002b).   
In July 2002, Ahmad Ajaj applied for a visa at the U.S. embassy in Islamabad.  
However, this request was denied because he had left the country without permission 
while his asylum application was still pending.  Ajaj subsequently met Ramzi Yousef at 
the Islamabad’s Arabic Center.  Yousef agreed to help Ajaj return to the United States 
(Mylroie, 2001).  On August 31, 1992 Ajaj and Ramzi Yousef traveled from Pakistan to 
New York’s John F. Kennedy (JFK) airport using aliases.  Both men possessed a variety 
of documents, including bank records, medical records, identification cards and 
educational records to support their assumed identities.  Because they thought they would 
receive less scrutiny, they purchased first class tickets for the flight.  When Ajaj arrived 
at the port of entry, the immigration inspector noticed that he was traveling on an altered 
Swedish passport and referred him to secondary inspection for additional screening 
(Eldridge et al., 2004).   
During the screening, inspectors searched Ajaj’s luggage and found a partially 
altered Swedish passport, a Jordanian passport, a plane ticket and British passport under 
the name of Mohammed Azan and documents to support the aliases (Eldridge et al., 
2004). The immigration inspectors found a “cheat sheet” that contained examples of the 
questions travelers would be asked during a normal encounter at the port of entry 
(Reeves, 1999).  Bomb making manuals also were found in his luggage (Camarota, 
2002b).  In addition, they found a document that urged violence and terrorist attacks 
against Islam’s enemies.  There was a booklet that described the best method to destroy 
buildings.  The booklet also included the chemical formulas needed to build bombs 
powerful enough for the job.  Immigration inspectors also found a videotape of a suicide 
bombing of what appeared to be a U.S. embassy and videotapes describing how to make 
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explosives and improvised weapons (Reeves, 1999).  Additionally, they found letters that 
referred to his attendance at terrorist training, instructions on how to forge documents, 
and two rubber stamp devices used to alter the seal on Saudi passports5 (Eldridge et al., 
2004).   
Based on these findings, Ajaj was detained pending a hearing after he informed 
the inspectors that he had applied for political asylum during a prior entry in February 
1992 (Eldridge et al., 2004).  Ajaj spent six months in jail for passport fraud.  However, 
he was able to help direct plans for the bombing from jail (Camarota, 2002b).  During the 
time he spent incarcerated, he maintained regular contact with the other conspirators 
(Tucker, 2000).  Telephone records indicate that Yousef and Mohammed Salameh, 
another conspirator, made frequent phone calls to Ajaj while he was in prison (Emerson, 
2002).  He even requested that the authorities release his belongs, including the terrorist 
kit, to the other individuals involved in the plot (Tucker, 2000).     
A few days after the bombing, Ajaj was released from prison.  However, eight 
days later he was arrested again for his involvement in the plot (Camarota, 2002b).  Ajaj 
continued to pursue his political asylum claim even after he was arrested.  When his 
request for an exclusion hearing was denied, he submitted a new application for asylum.  
He continued to attempt to exploit the legal immigration system even after his 
involvement in terrorist activities was uncovered.  Ajaj was convicted for his role in the 
plot and sentenced to 240 years in prison (Mylroie, 2001).   
a. Abuse of Legal Immigration System Summary 
Ahmad Ajaj manipulated the immigration system by using an alias, 
fraudulent passport(s) and false documents to support the false identity.  He abused the 
asylum program in order to remain in the country.  When Ajaj entered the country in 
August 1992, he had bomb making manuals and other terrorism related documents in his 
luggage.  He also had a document that contained examples of the types of questions 
                                                 
5
 The Staff Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States noted that 
al Qaeda favored Saudi passports partly due to the fact that irregularities in the Saudi passport issuance 
system made them more readily available (Eldridge et al., 2004).   
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travelers are asked during a routine immigration encounter at an airport.  This evidence 
indicates that he entered the country with the intent to engage in terrorist activity and he 
was aware that he needed to use the legal immigration system to gain admission.   
2. Ramzi Yousef 
Although they traveled together, Ajaj and Ramzi Yousef were not linked at the 
time of entry (Eldridge et al., 2004).  Yousef, a Pakistani national, was the mastermind 
behind the attack.  He did not have a valid visa to enter the United States (Emerson, 
2002).  He presented a fraudulent British passport in order to board the plane with Ajaj in 
Pakistan (Camarota, 2002b).  Similar to Ajaj, Yousef was referred to secondary 
inspection at the port of entry where he presented an Iraqi passport, which he later 
admitted was fraudulent (Eldridge et al., 2004).  He did not present the British passport 
he used to board the plane in Pakistan.  He had given the document along with his plane 
ticket to Ajaj (Mylroie, 2001).  He claimed that he obtained the Iraqi passport by bribing 
a Pakistani official.  The immigration inspectors also found an Islamic Center identity 
card with his photo on it but under the name of Khurram Khan, which is the name Ajaj 
used to travel to the United States.  Another boarding pass under the name of Mohammed 
Azan was found among Yousef’s belongings.  A plane ticket and passport under this 
name were found in Ajaj’s possession (Eldridge et al., 2004).   
Between the two of them, Ajaj and Yousef had a total of five fraudulent passports.  
These documents included a Saudi passport that had signs of alteration, an Iraqi passport 
purchased from a Pakistani official, a Jordanian passport and photo substituted Swedish 
and British passports.  They also had many documents, including bank records, 
educational records and medical records, to support their false identities (Eldridge et al., 
2004).   
Despite the fact that they were both referred for additional screening and their 
documents were obviously mingled, inspectors did not link the two together (Eldridge et 
al., 2004).  Some authorities believe that Yousef used Ajaj as a diversion in order to 
avoid detection at the port of entry (Mylroie, 2001).  Similar to Ajaj, Yousef applied for  
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political asylum.  He was subsequently paroled into the country due to insufficient 
detention space (Camarota, 2002b).  Like Ajaj, Yousef never appeared for his asylum 
hearing (Eldridge et al., 2004). 
In September 1993, Yousef was indicted for his involvement in the plot.  
However, he had already left the country using a fraudulent Pakistani passport (Eldridge 
et al., 2004).  He eventually traveled to the Philippines, where he and his associates 
developed a plot to bomb 12 airplanes en route between the United States and Asia.  
Forced to abort the operation, Yousef traveled to Pakistan.  While there, neighbors 
contacted local authorities and disclosed his whereabouts (Tucker, 2000).  Before he was 
arrested, he used a Pakistani identity card bearing the name Ali Mohammad to check into 
a guesthouse (Reeve, 1999).  In early 1995 he was captured in Pakistan and returned to 
the United States (Eldridge et al., 2004).  He was convicted in 1996 for his involvement 
in the plot and sentenced to 240 years in prison (Camarota, 2002b). 
Because Yousef used over 12 different aliases while he was engaging in terrorist 
activity, there is some controversy over his true identity.  He claimed to have considered 
himself Palestinian in one interview (Tucker, 2000).  Some reports indicate his 
nationality and ethnicity was Pakistani Baluch.  On November, 9, 1992, he reported that 
he had lost his passport to Jersey City police.  He claimed his name was Abdul Basit 
Mahmud Abdul Karim and that he was a Pakistani national raised in Kuwait.  On 
December 31, 1992, he took copies of current and previous passports for Abdul Basit to 
the Pakistani Consulate in New York.  As he claimed to the Jersey City police, he told the 
consular officials that he lost his passport and requested a new one.  However, the 
consular officials were suspicions of his photocopied documents and therefore denied his 
request.  However, they issued him a temporary passport valid for six months.  He was 
instructed to return home in order to correct the matter (Mylroie, 1995/96).  After the 
bombing, he used the Pakistani passport he obtained as Abdul Basit to flee the country 
(Mylroie, 2001).  He had three passports in his possession when he was finally arrested in 
Pakistan.  However, whether nor not any of these identities is his true identity is uncertain 
(Mylroie, 1995/96).   
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a. Abuse of Legal Immigration System Summary 
Similar to Ajaj, Ramzi Yousef manipulated the legal immigration system 
by assuming false identities, and using false passports and documents to support those 
identities.  He also applied for political asylum in order to remain in the country.  The 
fact that he failed to appear for his asylum hearing indicates that this was merely used as 
a means to enable him to enter and remain in the country.  Although his documents were 
co-mingled with Ajaj, immigration authorities did not realize that the two men were in 
fact connected.  Better pattern and trend analysis capabilities may have enabled 
immigration authorities to establish this connection. 
3. Mahmud Abouhalima  
Another leader of the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center, Mahmud 
Abouhalima, may have had ties to extremist groups in Egypt that helped provide funding 
for the bombing.  His involvement in the plot included helping to obtain the ingredients 
needed to make the bombs (Tucker, 2000).  Abouhalima was also responsible for driving 
the rental truck used in the bombing and driving the conspirators away from the crime 
scene (Eldridge et al., 2004).  He would have been unable to perform these functions if he 
had been unable to enter and remain in the country.   
Abouhalima was born in Egypt in 1959.  He became involved with members of 
the outlawed group al-Jama’a Islamiyya as a teenager.  This group considered Sheikh 
Abdel Rahman as its spiritual leader.  In the fall of 1985, Abouhalima entered the United 
States on a tourist visa.  When his visa expired in the spring 1986, he proceeded to 
remain in the country past his authorized period of admission.  After living in the country 
illegally, in 1987 he fraudulently claimed to qualify under the Seasonal Agricultural 
Worker (SAW) program,6 based on his employment for seven months on a farm in South 
Carolina (Eldridge et al., 2004).  However, Abouhalima, like many others who applied 
                                                 
6
 This program was created through the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), which 
included provisions that provided permanent resident status to foreign nationals who worked in agriculture 
for at least 90 days during the year prior to May 1, 1986.  IRCA also combined border enforcement with an 
amnesty program for illegal aliens who could prove that they had continuously lived in the United States 
prior to January 1, 1982 (Rudolph, 2006). 
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under this program, never worked in agriculture7 (Mylroie, 2001).  Abouhalima obtained 
legal permanent resident status through the SAW program in 1988 (Camarota, 2002b).  
During this time period when he claimed to have worked on a farm, he was actually in 
New York working as a taxi cab driver (Mylroie, 2001).  His wife even told a reporter 
that she did not remember Abouhalima taking any trips outside the New York 
metropolitan area besides one short trip to Michigan (Behar, 1993). 
Approximately one week after the attack, Abouhalima fled to Sudan.  His 
fingerprints, along with Yousef’s were later found on the bomb making manuals seized 
from Ajaj at the port of entry.  He was eventually arrested by Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) agents in Egypt and extradited to the United States for trial (Eldridge 
et al., 2004).  In fact, it was not until after Abouhalima was arrested and subjected to 
aggressive interrogation did the FBI learn of Yousef’s involvement in the plot (Mylroie, 
2001).  While in prison, Abouhalima attempted to broker a deal with the prosecutors 
claiming that he was manipulated by Yousef to conduct a crime far greater than he 
expected (Tucker, 2000).  He was convicted for his role in the attack and sentenced to 
240 years in prison (Reeve, 1999).   
a. Abuse of Legal Immigration System Summary  
Mahmud Abouhalima was able to participate in the plot because he abused 
the legal immigration system by overstaying his authorized period of admission and then 
subsequently became a permanent resident through a fraudulent application under the 
SAW program.  His status as a legal permanent resident enabled him to travel in and out 
of the country freely.  The ability to travel can be crucial to the operational planning for 
an attack.  Often the conspirator(s) leave the country in order to meet with other members 
of the organization or individuals involved in the plot in order to finalized plans for the 
attack, exchange information or receive additional funding (Camarota, 2002b).  In fact, 
                                                 
7
 Many officials believe that fraud was pervasive in the SAW program.  Illegal aliens could purchase 
employment letters to provide as evidence that they worked in agriculture from criminal rings (Bombing 
Probe, 1993).  According to Mark W. Everson, who was the Deputy Commissioner of the INS, immigration 
officials believed that over 50 percent of the applications filed by farm workers in Florida alone were 
fraudulent or contained indicators of fraud (Pear, 1987).   
 39
Abouhalima was only able to travel abroad and receive terrorist training after he received 
his green card.  His travels included several trips to the Afghanistan/Pakistan border, 
where he received training on making bombs (Camarota, 2002b).  
Additionally, Abouhalima had connections with other suspect individuals.  
He met Ramzi Yousef in 1988 during the war in Afghanistan.  In fact, Yousef quickly 
reconnected with Abouhalima after entering the country (Reeve, 1999).  Abouhalima 
frequently visited the apartment used by the other conspirators to prepare the chemical 
mixture used to make the bomb (Tucker, 2000). He is also implicated as a conspirator of 
the 1993 plot to bomb New York City landmarks (Camarota, 2002b).  He was a devoted 
follower of Sheik Rahman’s preachings (Tucker, 2000).  Abouhalima stated to reporters 
that he worked as the Sheik’s bodyguard and driver (Behar, 1993).  Additionally, he was 
supposed to drive the getaway car for El Sayyid Nosair after he assassinated Rabbi Meir 
Kahane (Eldridge et al., 2004), who was the American-Israeli leader of the Jewish 
Defense League in 1990 (Camarota, 2002b).  However, he was unable to perform this 
responsibility because he was asked to move his car because it was blocking the entrance 
to the hotel.  Along with several others, he was arrested that night but was released due to 
insufficient evidence (Eldridge et al., 2004).  The ability to use technology to identify 
non-obvious patterns or connections among potential threats may help border security 
agents to identify these types of relationships and uncover plots in the future. 
4. Mohammed Salameh 
Mohammed Salameh, a Palestinian/Jordanian national, rented the truck that was 
used in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing (Camarota, 2002b).  His mother’s family 
had a long history of connections to terrorist activity.  His grandfather joined the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) as an old man.  Israeli authorities arrested his 
uncle in 1968 for terrorist activity. His uncle served 18 years in prison before he was 
released and deported.  He later moved to Baghdad, Iraq where he became the number 
two operative in a PLO unit under Iraqi influence (Mylroie, 1995/96).   
In April 1984, Salameh was issued a Jordanian passport.  Ramzi Yousef’s 
fingerprints were subsequently found on this passport (Eldridge et al., 2004).  In 1987, he 
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was issued a five year visa and entered the United States (Reeve, 1999).  However, 
because he was only 19 years old and reported that he made only $50 a month, it is 
questionable why his visa application was approved.  Generally individuals who are 
young, unmarried and have low income fit the profile of an intending immigrant.8  
Despite that fact, Salameh was issued a tourist visa in Jordan and entered the country in 
1988.  Once his six month period of admission expired, he remained in the country 
illegally (Camarota, 2002b).   
Like Abouhalima, in September 1992 Salameh submitted an application pursuant 
to the 1986 Seasonal Agricultural Worker program (Eldridge et al., 2004).  Salameh 
applied under this program despite the fact that he did not enter the country until after the 
qualifying time period (Bombing Probe, 1993).  He claimed that he planted tomatoes and 
picked green beans in Crawford, Texas (Eldridge et al., 2004).  He was allowed to remain 
in the country while his fraudulent application was being processed.  The application was 
ultimately denied three years after he had applied.  He also submitted an application 
under the other amnesty program, which was designed to legalized workers who had been 
in the country before 1982.  After another 15 months, immigration officials denied this 
fraudulent application as well (Bombing Probe, 1993).     
The night of the bombing, Salameh drove both Yousef and another conspirator, 
Eyad Ismoil, to JFK airport.  Yousef used a false passport to escape to Pakistan, and 
Ismoil fled to Jordan.  However, Salameh appears to have been left behind intentionally.  
He was not provided adequate funds to purchase a plane ticket (Mylroie, 1995/96).  
Approximately one week after the bombing, Salameh was arrested while trying to obtain 
a $400 refund on the rental truck (Eldridge et al., 2004). He apparently needed the money 
in order to flee the country (Tucker, 2000).  He was charged with criminally violating 
immigration laws and for his involvement with the bombing.  In March 1994, he was  
 
                                                 
8
 Any individual who is likely to overstay his or her visa and remain permanently in the United States 
is considered an intending immigrant.  Section 214(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act states that all 
individuals will be presumed to be intending immigrants until they prove that they are otherwise entitled to 
nonimmigrant status.  Consular officers are instructed not to issue a visa unless the applicant can establish 
that he or she has a permanent residence in his or her country of origin, that the visit to the U.S. will be 
temporary in nature and that the applicant has the financial means to return home (Camarota, 2002b).   
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convicted on all counts, including charges pertaining to fraud and misuse of visas, 
permits and other documents.  He was sentenced to 240 years in prison (Eldridge et al., 
2004).   
a. Abuse of Legal Immigration System Summary  
Similar to Mahmud Abouhalima, Mohammed Salameh abused the 
immigration system by overstaying his authorized period of admission and then 
subsequently submitting a fraudulent application under both amnesty programs.  Even 
though his applications were ultimately denied, he was able to continue to live and work 
in the United States illegally because there was no mechanism to require individuals who 
were denied permanent status to leave the country (Camarota, 2002b).  Under the SAW 
program, illegal aliens whose applications were denied could not be deported based on 
that application unless there was evidence of criminal fraud (Bombing Probe, 1993).  He 
would not have been able to participate in the plot if he had been required to depart the 
country once his status expired or his applications were denied. 
Salameh also had connections to other suspect individuals.  He attended 
Sheik Rahman’s mosque in New Jersey and also had ties to El Sayyed Nosair (Tucker, 
2000).  The night that Nosair killed Rabbi Kahane, Salameh was arrested at one of the 
addresses used by Nosair.  He admitted he was with Nosair at the shooting.  However, 
authorities released him the next day due to insufficient evidence (Eldridge et al., 2004).  
Salameh also conspired with Abouhalima to free Nosair from prison (Tucker, 2000).   
5. Biblal Alkaisi  
Another conspirator, Jordanian national Biblal Alkaisi, filed for temporary 
protected status9 (TPS) using the name Bilal El Qisi in August 1991.  Because he could 
not get TPS as a citizen of Jordan, Alkaisi applied claiming to be a Lebanese national 
because Lebanon was a designated TPS country at that time.  He stated that he was born 
                                                 
9
 TPS can be granted to eligible nationals of designated countries who cannot return safely to their 
home country due to ongoing armed conflict, environmental disaster or other extraordinary events 
(Eldridge et al., 2004).   
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in Lebanon and entered the country in New York in September 1988.  The INS Forensic 
Document Laboratory determined that the Lebanese birth certificate provided by Alkaisi 
in support of his application was made from a color copier.  Additionally, the English 
translation of the document was incorrect.  Finally, the immigration entry record he 
submitted was also determined to have been altered to change the country of birth 
(Eldridge et al., 2004).   
Alkaisi subsequently applied for asylum in May 1992 (Kephart, 2005).  On his 
application, he claimed that he was from Jordan and entered the country in October 1987 
through New York.  He stated that immigration officials did not inspect him.  Because 
they did not connect the asylum application with his TPS application, INS created 
another file for Alkaisi.  His asylum claim was terminated in 1992 because he failed to 
appear for his asylum interview.  However, he remained in the country illegally (Eldridge 
et al., 2004).   
On March 25, 1993, Alkaisi was arrested for his involvement in the bombing.  
The subsequent investigation revealed that all of the employment and residence 
information provided in support of his asylum application were fraudulent.  He was 
indicted with five other conspirators in August 1993.  However, the U.S. Attorney later 
severed him from the indictment due to insufficient evidence.  In May 1994, he pled 
guilty to making false statements to INS and was sentenced to 20 months in prison.  He 
was deported to Jordan immediately after he was released from prison (Eldridge et al., 
2004). 
a. Abuse of Legal Immigration System Summary  
Biblal Alkaisi utilized a variety of tactics to exploit the legal immigration 
system, including submitting fraudulent documents in support of his applications, 
submitting fraudulent claims for two immigration benefit programs and using aliases.  
Better capability to verify identity may have enabled immigration officials to connect 
Alkaisi’s two immigration files.  This may have helped them discover the contradictory 
information he provided on his applications.   
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Biblal Alkaisi also had connections to other terrorists that were not fully 
recognized.  In November 1990 he accompanied Nosair to a rally held by Rabbi Meir 
Kahane.  Nosair shot and killed Kahane at this event.  Alkaisi was later questioned 
regarding Kahane’s shooting but was released by the police (Eldridge et al., 2004).   
6. Eyad Ismoil 
Eyad Ismoil, a Jordanian national, had been acquainted with Yousef since 
childhood (Reeve, 1999).  He was issued a student visa from the U.S. consulate in 
Kuwait (Eldridge et al., 2004).  He entered the country 1989 to study English at Wichita 
State University.  He left school after only three semesters, thereby violating the terms of 
his admission.  He remained in the country illegally and eventually moved to New York 
(Camarota, 2002b).   
Ismoil was responsible for driving the van loaded with explosives used in the 
bombing (Camarota, 2002b).  He would have been unable to have performed this 
function if there had been better mechanisms employed to prevent illegal aliens from 
remaining in the country.  He claimed that he believed the van was carrying boxes of 
shampoo, not boxes of explosives (Mylroie, 2001).  After the bombing, Ismoil 
immediately fled to Jordan.  In September 1994, he was indicted for his role in the 
bombing.  Almost a year later, he was extradited from Jordan and returned to the United 
States for prosecution.  On November 13, 1997, Ismoil was convicted, sentenced to 240 
years in prison and ordered to pay $10 million in restitution (Eldridge et al., 2004).   
a. Abuse of Legal Immigration System Summary  
Eyad Ismoil violated the terms of his student visa by dropping out of 
school after only three semesters.  He subsequently remained in the country without 
lawful status.  Better interior enforcement of immigration law would have prevented 
Ismoil from remaining in the country and engaging in acts of terrorism. 
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7. Mohammed Abouhalima 
Similar to his brother Mahmud, Mohammed Abouhalima, an Egyptian national, 
entered the country through New York on a tourist visa in July 1985.  He was authorized 
to remain in the country until August 15, 1985.  After his authorized period of admission 
had expired, he submitted an application to INS to extend his status.  His request was 
denied and he was ordered to voluntarily depart the country by December 5, 1985.  He 
did not comply with this order and remained in the country illegally for several years 
(Eldridge et al., 2004).  He obtained temporary resident status by fraudulently claiming to 
be an agricultural worker in order to qualify under the 1986 Amnesty (Camarota, 2002b).  
His application to become a permanent resident was denied in 1992 once it was 
determined that he never worked in agriculture picking beans.  In fact, the employer that 
petitioned on Abouhalima’s behalf eventually pled guilty in federal court to providing 
260 fraudulent employment records used by aliens to support their applications under the 
SAW program (Eldridge et al., 2004).  Abouhalima was convicted in 1997 for being an 
accessory to the crime by helping his brother flee the country (Camarota, 2002b).  He 
was sentenced to 96 months in prison and was ordered deported after his time was served 
(Eldridge et al., 2004).   
a. Abuse of Legal Immigration System Summary  
Similar to his brother, the fact that Mohammed Abouhalima overstayed 
his authorized period of admission enabled him to participate in the plot.  Additionally, 
he was able to remain in the country because he was able to obtain temporary resident 
status by submitting a fraudulent application under the SAW program.   
8. Nidal Ayyad 
Nidal Ayyad was the best educated member of the conspiracy.  He graduated 
from Rutgers University and worked as a chemical engineer (Tucker, 2000).  He 
provided the expertise in explosives for the attack (Camarota, 2002b).  His role included 
helping to obtain and mix the chemicals used to make the bomb (Tucker, 2000).  In May 
1994, he was convicted and sentenced to 240 years in prison for his involvement 
(Eldridge et al., 2004).   
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Ayyad was born in Kuwait but has Jordanian citizenship.  His father filed the 
petition to allow him to come to the United States.  He was granted lawful permanent 
resident status as an unmarried son or daughter of a U.S. citizen in October 1985.  He 
became a naturalized citizen in March 1991 (Eldridge et al., 2004).  On May 28, 1996, 
the INS office in Newark, New Jersey recommended to the Regional Director, INS 
Eastern Region that Ayyad’s citizenship be revoked based on his membership in a 
terrorist group before and after he naturalized.  This recommendation was based on 
several sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act including Section 340(a)(2), 
which pertains to withholding a material fact; Section 340 (c), which pertains to 
reopening naturalization proceedings and Section 313(3), which pertains to membership 
in an organization that advocates the violent overthrow of the government.  It is unclear 
whether action was taken to revoke his citizenship based on this recommendation.  
According the Staff Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 
United States: 9/11 and Terrorist Travel, the 9/11 Commission staff were prevented from 
reviewing his immigration file due to Privacy Act constraints (Eldridge et al., 2004). 
a. Abuse of Legal Immigration System Summary  
Nidal Ayyad violated immigration laws by withholding his membership in 
a terrorist group when he applied for naturalization.  His ability to obtain citizenship 
enabled him to remain in this country in a legal status and engage in terrorist activity. 
B. CASE STUDY 2—THE JUNE 1993 PLOT TO BOMB NEW YORK CITY 
LANDMARKS10 
The 1993 World Trade Center bombing was almost immediately followed by 
another conspiracy.  On June 24, 1993, 10 individuals were arrested for plotting a Day of 
Terror which included multiple attacks on New York City landmarks including the 
United Nations Headquarters, the George Washington Bridge, the Lincoln and Holland 
Tunnels and the Federal Building at 26 Federal Plaza (Emerson, 2002).  In total, there 
                                                 
10
 There were several other individuals involved in the plot that are not included in this case study. 
There is not much information is available regarding their immigration histories.  The 9/11 Commission 
staff were prevented from reviewing their immigration files due to Privacy Act constraints (Eldridge et al., 
2004). 
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were 11 foreign-born terrorists involved in the plot.  Three native-born U.S. citizens who 
had converted to militant Islam were also involved (Camarota, 2002b).  Prosecutors claim 
that the plotters intended to detonate the bombs within 10 minutes of each other 
(Kushner, 2003).  During the sentencing of some of the conspirators, the judge stated that 
if this plot had been successful, it would have resulted in the death of hundreds or 
possibly thousands of innocent people.  He also stated that the bombs they intended to 
explode would have caused destruction more significant than anything since the 
American Civil War.  The judge claimed that the blasts that would have resulted if these 
bombs had been detonated would have made the 1993 World Trade Center bombing pale 
in comparison (Fried, 1996).     
Although there were members of the conspiracy that did not need to abuse the 
immigration system, this example illustrates that manipulation of the immigration system 
is an important component in the tactical planning of acts of terrorism by foreign born 
terrorists.  Approximately 79 percent of the conspirators involved needed to engage in 
some form of immigration fraud or otherwise violate immigration law in order to gain 
access to the country. Furthermore, as stated previously, the immigration system does not 
need to identify all of the conspirators involved in a plot in order to be an effective tool in 
counterterrorism efforts.  For example, if the conspirator who has the expertise in 
explosives is prevented from entering or remaining in the country, the ability to carry out 
the plot is critically disabled.  In this case study, the mastermind behind the plot 
committed repeated violations of immigration law.  Preventing his entry into the country 
may not have entirely eliminated the threat, but it could have dramatically reduced the 
conspirators’ ability to operate.   
Analysis of the immigration histories of the foreign born terrorists involved in the 
plot included below demonstrate how the lack of sharing vital information regarding 
potential threats can have detrimental consequences.  They also highlight the importance 
of ensuring watch list information is updated on a routine basis as a means of preventing 
threats from going undetected.  Similar to the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing case 
study, this example illustrates that increased pattern and trend analysis technology could 
aid organizations in identifying terrorist plots by establishing previously unidentified 
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connections among the parties involved.  The fact that several of the terrorists involved in 
this plot obtained significant immigration benefits through fraudulent applicants 
demonstrates that immigration officials need sound procedures and capabilities to detect 
and deter immigration benefit fraud.  Finally this example also underscores the fact that 
the organizations responsible for border security need better mechanisms to establish and 
verify an individual’s identity in order to prevent terrorists from using false identities to 
avoid detection. 
1. Sheik Abdel Rahman 
Sheik Abdel Rahman, an Egyptian national, led the plot to bomb the landmarks.  
Rahman is one of the most infamous foreign nationals who was able to obtain a visa.  He 
is considered one of the spiritual leaders who helped inspire al Qaeda.  By the 1980s, 
Rahman was already a well known public figure with direct links to terrorist activity 
(Camarota, 2002b).  He was tried for the attempted assassination of Egyptian president 
Hosni Mubarak but was ultimately acquitted (Emerson, 2002).  He has even been 
associated with the terrorists involved with assassinating Egyptian President Anwar 
Sadat.  His name has been included on a terrorist watch list since 1987.  Despite these 
facts, he was able to enter the United States using a tourist visa issued in Khartoum, 
Sudan on at least four occasions in the late 1980s.  Although he was on a watch list, 
Rahman was issued the visa because the consular officer in Khartoum, Sudan did not 
conduct the check properly (Camarota, 2002b). Additionally, his visa applications were 
incomplete, misleading and possibly contained material misrepresentations in his answers 
to questions on the form (Eldridge et al., 2004).   
Rahman’s tourist visa was revoked in November 1990, six months after it had 
been issued.  However, he had already used that visa to enter the country twice.  He 
entered the country again in December 1990 using the same visa even though it had been 
revoked because he provided a variation of the name in the passport on his entry 
documents (Eldridge et al., 2004).  In January 1991, he obtained permanent resident 
status as a minister of religion by using a false name.  This status increased his ability to 
engage in illicit activities because it allowed Rahman to work and travel freely in and out 
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of the country.  That status was revoked in March 1992 because it was discovered that he 
had provided false statements in support of his application (Camarota, 2002b).     
After the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, Rahman was taken into custody for 
his possible involvement in the plot.  INS officials requested that the Board of 
Immigration Review expeditiously process his deportation case.   Reports indicated that 
this request may have been related to the extradition negotiations between the United 
States and Egypt concerning Mahmud Abouhalima.  At the time, the Department of State 
declined to comment on whether U.S. authorities pledged to return Rahman to Egypt in 
exchange for their cooperation in extraditing Abouhalima (DeStefano, 1993).  In order to 
prevent deportation, Rahman applied for asylum.  His application for asylum was still 
pending when he was arrested for his involvement in the New York City landmarks plot 
(Camarota, 2002b).  On January 17, 1996 he was sentenced to life in prison for his 
involvement in the landmark plot (Eldridge et al., 2004).   
a. Abuse of Legal Immigration System Summary 
Sheik Abdel Rahman committed several violations of the immigration 
system.  He used variations of his name or false identities to avoid detection.  He 
submitted applications for benefits that were either incomplete or contained material 
misrepresentations.  Similar to some of the other terrorists included in this study, he had 
connections with other suspect individuals.  He is widely believed to have inspired the 
1993 attack on the World Trade Center (Camarota, 2002b).  At least three of the 
individuals involved in that plot attended the mosque where Rahman preached (Kushner, 
2003).  Investigators found telephone records that show that Rahman made several phone 
calls to the apartment where Yousef lived from 1992-1993.  However, the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation ultimately was unable to directly link Rahman to the 1993 World Trade 
Center bombing (Emerson, 2002).   Better pattern and trend analysis capabilities may 
have enabled investigators to identify these connections. 
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2. El Sayyid Nosair 
Another conspirator, El Sayyid Nosair, was one of the earliest Islamic extremist 
terrorists (Camarota, 2002b).  Sources indicated that his anti-Western views developed 
long before he immigrated to the United States.  In the 1970s, he became active in 
extremist movements in Egypt while in college (Sachs & Kocieniewski, 1993).  Nosair 
entered the country on a tourist visa in 1981 (Camarota, 2002b).  He overstayed his visa 
and “candidly admitted that he was looking for an American woman to marry so he could 
obtain a green card” (Mylroie, 2001, p. 11).  In less than a year after his arrival, Nosair 
met a recent American divorcee through a matchmaker.  In June 1982, they were married 
a few months after they met (Mylroie, 2001).  He became a naturalized citizen in 1989 
(Camarota, 2002b).  Prior to becoming a citizen, the FBI observed him under surveillance 
shooting a variety of weapons at a gun range with three of the conspirators involved in 
the 1993 World Trade Center bombing (Mylroie, 2001).  However, this information was 
not provided to INS (Eldridge et al., 2004).   
After the World Trade Center bombing, FBI agents searched one of the 
conspirator’s apartments and found Nosair’s U.S. passport, five Nicaraguan birth 
certificates, Nicaraguan drivers’ licenses and five Nicaraguan passports issued in July 
1991.  The foreign documents, intended for Nosair and his family, were issued under 
false identities (Eldridge et al., 2004).  In fact, Nosair routinely utilized a variety of 
documents.  For example, he had been issued three drivers’ licenses each listing a 
different address.  He also frequently used different variations of his name.  On his 
application for naturalization, he claimed he was El Sayyd Abdulaziz El Sayyd.  He used 
El Sayyd Nossair on city employment records (Mylroie, 2001).   
Nosair was later convicted as part of the conspiracy to bomb New York City 
landmarks (Camarota, 2002b) and sentenced to life in prison.  In May 1996, INS 
recommended revocation of Nosair’s citizenship based on the fact that he lacked good 
morale character, which is a requirement for naturalization.  He was also subject to a 
violation for having unlawfully obtained citizenship.  Because the 9/11 Commission staff 
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were prevented from reviewing his immigration file due to Privacy Act constraints, it is 
not clear whether action was taken on this recommendation (Eldridge et al., 2004).   
Nosair also was responsible for the assassination of Rabbi Meir Kahane 
(Camarota, 2002b).  In 1991, Nosair was found not guilty of murder or attempted murder 
but was convicted of carrying a weapon and assault.  He was sentenced to eight years in 
prison (Eldridge et al., 2004).  The Kahane assassination was originally believed to be an 
isolated event (The Associated Press, 1999).  After the 1993 World Trade Center 
bombing and the plot to bomb New York City landmarks, law enforcement officials 
began to believe that Kahane’s murder was part of a much larger terrorist conspiracy.  
After the shooting, the FBI raided his apartment and found videotapes about the Arab-
Isralei conflict, a mercenary magazine, a slab of sheetrock used in target practice, 
photographs of local landmarks and informational materials about bomb making.  Agents 
even found the formula to make the bomb that was later used in the 1993 World Trade 
Center attack (Sachs & Kocieniewski, 1993).  They found one of Rahman’s sermons 
calling for the destruction of symbols of capitalism (Kushner, 2003).  They also found 
several military documents from Fort Bragg, North Carolina.  Some of the documents 
were classified as “Secret,” “Sensitive” or “Top Secret for Training.”  These included 
intelligence reports, reports on the locations of U.S. Special Forces stationed in the 
Middle East, data on the situation in Afghanistan prepared by U.S. Central Command and 
reports on the Soviets’ military strength in Afghanistan (Reeve, 1999).  These documents 
were eventually traced to Ali Mohammed, who was a sergeant in the Army Special 
Forces.  Mohammed was later convicted for his involvement in the 1998 East African 
embassy bombings (Eldridge et al., 2004).       
a. Abuse of Legal Immigration System Summary 
El Sayyid Nosair’s repeated violations of immigration law enabled him to 
remain in the country and participate in the planning of this attack.  Since he was 
admitted on a tourist visa, he overstayed his authorized period of admission, utilized a 
variety of identities, provided false information in support of his applications and entered 
into a fraudulent marriage in order to obtain permanent resident status. 
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3. Matarawy Mohammed Said Saleh 
Matarawy Mohammed Said Saleh, an Egyptian national, had a minor role in the 
plot.  He was responsible for providing stolen cars to the other conspirators.  He became a 
legal permanent resident though marriage to a U.S citizen (Camarota, 2002b).  In fact, he 
married two American women in an effort to obtain legal immigration status.  In 1986, he 
attempted to obtain permanent residence through his marriage to Evelyn Cortez; this was 
Cortez’s second marriage.  Her first marriage was also to a foreign national.  In his 
application, Saleh claimed to be employed as a scuba diver and live at the same address 
as Cortez.  He used the alias Wahid Mohamed Ahmed on this petition.  The petition was 
denied because Cortez failed to provide the divorce decree from her prior marriage.  In 
October, Saleh married Leslie Sonkin in a ceremony in Egypt even though he was still 
legally married to Cortez.  Sonkin filed an immigrant visa petition for Saleh which 
claimed that he had no prior marriages.  In December 1987, he entered the country as a 
conditional resident based on the petition filed by Sonkin.  This status authorized him to 
remain in the country for two years.  At the end of that time period, Sonkin and Saleh 
could apply to remove the conditions on his status in order to become a permanent 
resident.  However, in August, 1988 he was convicted for selling heroin and sentenced to 
five years in prison.  After two and a half years, he was released on parole and turned 
over to INS for deportation.  INS initiated deportation proceedings, but he was released 
on bail while the order was still pending (Eldridge et al., 2004).   
Despite his outstanding deportation order, illegal immigration status, prior heroin 
conviction and involvement with credit card fraud and theft, Salaeh was placed on 
supervised release for three years.  In June 1996, he was arrested by INS agents and 
placed in custody (Eldridge et al., 2004).  He eventually pled guilty to his involvement 
and testified against the other terrorists involved.  He was sentenced to time served 
(Camarota, 2002b).  In November 1996, he was released from prison and finally deported 
to Egypt (Eldridge et al., 2004).   
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a. Abuse of Legal Immigration System Summary 
Matarawy Mohammed Said Saleh was able to remain in the country and 
engage in terrorist activity because he entered into a fraudulent marriage in order to 
obtain an immigration benefit.  He submitted multiple marriage-based petitions in order 
to obtain legal permanent resident status, provided false information and used aliases in 
an effort to circumvent efforts to detect his prior marriages.   
4. Fadil Abdelgani 
Another conspirator in the plot, Sudanese national Fadil Abdelgani, mixed 
explosives for the attack.  Similar to Rahman, he engaged in immigration fraud in order 
to remain in the United States.  In 1987, he used a tourist visa to enter the United States.  
He subsequently overstayed his authorized period of admission and remained in the 
country illegally.  In 1991, he obtained legal permanent resident status by entering into a 
sham marriage with a U.S. citizen (Camarota, 2002b).  After his arrest, he admitted that 
he did not know his wife’s whereabouts.  He also claimed that he had another wife who 
was still living in Sudan (Rashbaum, 1993).  He was sentenced to 25 years in prison for 
his involvement in the plot (Fried, 1996).   
a. Abuse of Legal Immigration System Summary  
Fadil Abdelgani entered into a fraudulent marriage with a U.S citizen and 
concealed his first marriage in order to obtain legal permanent resident status. 
C. CASE STUDY 3—THE AUGUST 1998 EMBASSY BOMBINGS IN 
AFRICA 
On August 7, 1998, two truck bombs exploded almost simultaneously at the U.S. 
embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya (Camarota, 2002b).  That 
morning terrorists drove a truck filled with explosives and aluminum nitrate into the rear 
entrance of the U.S. embassy in Nairobi.  The explosion caused significant structural 
damage and even tore the back of the building off.  Although the embassy remained 
standing, the seven story building located next to it collapsed.  One survivor was buried 
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under the rubble for two days.  Approximately 10 minutes later, another truck loaded 
with explosives and canisters of oxygen and acetylene gas was exploded in front of the 
U.S. embassy in Dar es Salaam.  The blast caused debris to be thrown approximately 600 
yards from the bomb’s center (Kushner, 2003).  The explosion was so powerful it cut the 
body of the suicide bomber in two and flung the top half of his torso, which was still 
holding the steering wheel, into the embassy building (Reeve, 1999).  The August 1998 
attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania resulted in 301 fatalities and left 
5,007 individuals injured (Kephart, 2005).  The terrorists involved claimed that the attack 
was designed to force the evacuation of all American forces from Muslim territory 
(Kushner, 2003).   
Although these attacks occurred outside of the continental United States, 
operatives located within the country were instrumental in facilitating the attacks.  For 
example, Osama bin Laden used operatives located in the United States to purchase and 
provide him with the satellite phone used to plan the attacks on the embassies (Emerson, 
2002).  There were a total of four foreign-born terrorists who traveled to the United States 
who were involved in the plot.11  At least three of the conspirators were naturalized U.S. 
citizens who worked for al Qaeda while living and working in the United States 
(Camarota, 2002b).  The weaknesses in the legal immigration system that were exploited 
allowed the terrorists to remain in the United States to help facilitate the tactical planning 
for this plot.  The primary lesson to be learned from this case study is how valuable 
obtaining significant immigration benefits such as citizenship can be to the operational 
planning of attacks.   The below individuals involved used the freedom to travel their 
fraudulently obtained status as United States citizens provided to engage in the 
operational planning for this and other terrorist attacks.  Therefore, denying terrorists 
access to these benefits by enhancing the ability to detect and deter fraudulent 
applications is an important component of protecting national security.   
                                                 
11
 However, there were several additional conspirators involved.  Approximately 20 members of al 
Qaeda are believed to have been involved in the attacks (Camarota, 2002b).    
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1. Ali Mohammed 
Ali Mohammed, an Egyptian national, was considered one of bin Laden’s top 
lieutenants at the time (Kushner, 2003).  He is believed to have written a significant 
portion of al Qaeda’s organizational handbook which provided instructions on how to 
formulate plans for an attack, select targets and avoid detection while operating in the 
West (Camarota, 2002b).  He admitted that in 1992 he provided military and explosives 
training to al Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan.  He also instructed the operatives in how 
to create cells and intelligence operations.  He was involved in establishing an al Qaeda 
cell in Kenya in the early 1990s.  Mohammed also helped to establish a car business to 
help raise money for the organization and helped to create a refugee charity program used 
to provide fraudulent identity documents to terrorist operatives (Williams & McCormick, 
2001).  He frequently traveled to Pakistan and Afghanistan to help oversee the terrorist 
camps.  He was responsible for arranging bin Laden’s move from Afghanistan to Sudan 
in 1991.  He also was named as one of the potential conspirators who were not indicted in 
the 1993 World Trade Center bombing (Emerson, 2002).   
Despite the fact that Ali Mohammed was included on a watch list of terror 
suspects in 1984, he was able to obtain a visa from the American Embassy in Cairo in 
1985. At that time, the watch lists were not automated.  In addition, the fact that he had a 
common Egyptian name could explain why he was issued the visa (Camarota, 2002).  He 
obtained permanent resident status by marrying a U.S. citizen he met on the airplane 
during his first visit to the country (Eldridge et al., 2004).  He contacted the woman 
within a few days of arriving in the country.  They were married after only six weeks.  
Acquaintances of the couple stated they felt his wife seemed genuinely interested in the 
relationship. However, they suspected for Mohammed it was merely a means to obtain 
permanent status (Williams & McCormick, 2001).  He eventually became a U.S. citizen 
and lived in the United States for many years (Camarota, 2002b).   
In 1986, Mohammed joined the U.S. military.  He became a sergeant assigned to 
the U.S. Army Special Operations at Fort Bragg (Emerson, 2002).  While in the army he 
appeared in training videos on the Middle East.  He also was involved in conducting 
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training for soldiers being deployed in the Middle East (Risen, 1998).  During the three 
years he worked for the U.S. Army, he also worked for al Qaeda, helping to recruit new 
members, provide training in Afghanistan and Sudan and plan several attacks (Camarota, 
2002b).  Records from the 1993 World Trade Center bombing indicate that Mohammed 
began to conduct guerilla warfare training in New Jersey for Islamic extremists in 1989.  
Nosair and Mahmud Abouhalima were among the attendees (Emerson, 2002).  
Mohammed traveled to Kenya in 1993 to conduct surveillance on several potential 
targets, including the U.S. embassy (Eldridge et al., 2004).  According to the indictment, 
he even used his U.S. passport to enter the embassy in Nairobi in February 1994 (The 
Associated Press, 1999).  During his trial, he admitted he conducted surveillance as early 
as 1993 on the embassy in Nairobi (Kushner, 2003).  He was finally arrested for being an 
al Qaeda operative in 1998 (Emerson, 2002).  Mohammed was charged with participating 
in other terrorist related activities in addition to the African embassy bombings in the 
1998 indictment (Kushner, 2003).  On October 20, 2000, he pled guilty to his role in the 
embassy bombings (Emerson, 2002).   
2. Khalid Abu al Dahab 
Khalid Abu al Dahab is believed to have participated in approximately half a 
dozen terrorist attacks, including the bombings of U.S. embassies in Africa (Camarota, 
2002b).  Al Dahab met Ali Mohammed while he was a medical student in Egypt in 1984 
(Williams, 2001).  Ali Mohammed recruited al Dahab into what would later become al 
Qaeda.  In 1986, he entered the United States by obtaining a student visa to study 
medicine.  Once admitted, he quickly tried to marry an American citizen in order to 
obtain legal permanent resident status (Camarota, 2002b).  Shortly after arriving in 
California, he married a woman he met through Ali Mohammed’s wife (Williams, 2001).  
His first marriage only lasted one month.  He subsequently married another American, 
but that marriage also only lasted a short time.  The court investigator concluded that al 
Dahab’s second marriage was based on convenience.  Al Dahab ultimately obtained 
permanent resident status through his third marriage and eventually became a naturalized 
citizen (Camarota, 2002b).    
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During his 12 years in the United States, al Dahab transported fraudulent 
passports and money to terrorists worldwide from his home in California (Camarota, 
2002b).  He and Ali Mohammed used fake passports and identity documents to smuggle 
in one of bin Laden’s chief deputies into the United States to help raise funds.  He 
traveled to terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and conducted training for terrorist 
operatives.  He also worked as a communications specialist for al Qaeda.  He was 
sentenced to 15 years in prison for his involvement with al Qaeda (Williams, 2001).   
a. Abuse of Legal Immigration System by Ali Mohammed and 
Khalid Abu al Dahab Summary  
Ali Mohammed’s and Khalid Abu al Dahab’s ability to obtain permanent 
legal status contributed to their ability to engage in illicit activities.  Because a U.S. 
passport enables the holder to travel freely throughout the world, recruiting U.S. citizens 
was one of bin Laden’s major policy objectives (Emerson, 2002).  Therefore, the 
immigration system was exploited in order to obtain access to U.S. passports in order to 
facilitate the free travel of terrorist operatives, which can be essential for tactical planning 
of an attack.  Al Dahab admitted that al Qaeda leaders were attracted to U.S. citizens 
because of the flexibility a U.S. passport gives the individual to travel.  He recruited 10 
U.S. citizens into al Qaeda during the 12 years he lived in the United States.  After his 
arrest, he stated that bin Laden personally congratulated him for his successful efforts to 
recruit U.S. citizens.  He further stated that in the mid 1990s, he traveled with Ali 
Mohammed to Afghanistan to brief bin Laden on their recruitment efforts.  Al Dahab 
stated that bin Laden wanted access to the recruits’ U.S. passports for use by other 
operatives.  Ali Mohammed admitted he gave his passport and driver’s license to another 
operative in order to facilitate his entry into the country from Canada (Williams, 2001).   
D. CASE STUDY 4—THE 2007 PLOT TO ATTACK FORT DIX MILITARY 
BASE 
In May 2007, six individuals were arrested for plotting to attack New Jersey’s 
Fort Dix military base (Russakoff & Eggen, 2007).  The base is currently primarily used 
to train reservists being deployed to Iraq (Mulvihill, 2009a).  The terrorists attempted to 
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kill the approximately 14,000 solders stationed at Fort Dix using assault riffles and 
grenades.  The group of foreign-born terrorist trained for the operation by practicing at a 
shooting range in Pennsylvania (Russakoff & Eggen, 2007).  Five of the plotters were 
convicted of weapons charges and conspiracy to kill military personnel (Mulvihill, 
2009a).  The sixth conspirator was charged with helping the conspirators illegally obtain 
firearms (Russakoff & Eggen, 2007).  Two of the conspirators were arrested while trying 
to buy seven rifles from an FBI informant.  The other conspirators were arrested in 
different locations around the same time (Department of Justice [DOJ] 2008).   
According the FBI and the Department of Justice (DOJ), the arrests were the 
product of a 16-month investigation into the group.  The FBI first learned of the threat in 
January 2006.  A video store clerk alerted police to a video that showed several young 
men firing assault weapons (Russakoff & Eggen, 2007).  The clerk contacted law 
enforcement after he watched the videotape the suspects gave him to dub onto a DVD.  
The tape included images of 10 men shooting weapons at a firing range whiling calling 
for jihad (Temple-Raston, 2009).  During the course of the investigation, the FBI paid 
two informants to follow the suspects and record conversations (Ryan, 2009b).   
Three of the terrorists involved in this plot were illegal immigrants from the 
former Yugoslavia.  While here, they studied jihadist videos and lectures and became 
more devote in their religious beliefs (Ryan, 2009a).  Authorities did not find any 
connection between the organization and al Qaeda or any other international terrorist 
organization.  It appeared to be a self-directed operation.  The group was considered a 
homegrown terror cell or leaderless group that united based on a shared fascination with 
images of jihad found on the internet (Russakoff & Eggen, 2007).  Homegrown terrorists 
bring an added dimension to border security.  They often are as dangerous as known 
groups and can easily operate under the radar (Temple-Raston, 2009).    
The primary lesson learned from this case study is the important role sustained 
and effective interior enforcement of immigration laws can play in enhancing border 
security.  Three brothers involved in the plot, Dritan, Eljvir and Shain Duka, were ethnic 
Albanians from the former Yugoslavia living in the United States illegally.  The fact that 
their illegal status went undetected enabled them to engage in illicit activities in this 
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country.  It is believed that they entered the country by illegally crossing the border near 
Brownsville, Texas with their family in 1984 (Krikorian, 2007).  The family lived in 
Texas and Brooklyn, New York before they moved to Cherry Hill, New Jersey in 1996 
(Moroz, 2007)  The Duka family applied for asylum five years after crossing the border.  
However, their case remained pending for nearly 20 years.  Because their asylum claim 
was still being processed, efforts to deport the family were suspended (Krikorian, 2007).  
The family was never given permanent legal status (Appezzato, 2007).  After their arrest, 
the father was detained based on immigration violations and was placed in deportation 
proceedings (Ripley, 2007).  His wife was also issued a summons for immigration 
violations but was not detained because the couple had a 16 year old son.  Although there 
was no evidence that their parents were involved in the plot, law enforcement officials 
stated that their illegal status could not be ignored (Appezzato, 2007).  
The Duka brothers’ lack of legal status restricted their capabilities.  They 
complained that they could not legally obtain firearms for use in the attack because they 
did not have legal permanent resident status.  Dritan Duka admitted that he owned a black 
gun and a shotgun but was aware that this was illegal because he did not have permanent 
resident status (Krikorian, 2007).  Agron Abdullahu, an ethnic Albanian who had 
acquired legal permanent resident status, was charged with helping the Duka brothers 
obtain firearms illegally (Russakoff & Eggen, 2007).  He pled guilty to the charges and 
was sentenced to 420 months in prison (DOJ 2008).  During his plea hearing, he admitted 
that he knew that the Duka brothers were living in the country illegally.  Abdullahu also 
admitted that on at least two occasions he provided them with firearms and ammunition 
to possess and use at a firing range.  He also admitted that he purchased approximately 
2,500 rounds of ammunition for the brothers and others (DOJ, 2007).   
In December 2008, the Duka brothers and two other conspirators were convicted 
of conspiracy to murder members of the U.S. military.  Dritan Duka and Shain Duka 
were convicted on possession of weapons in furtherance of a crime of violence.  
Additionally, all three Duka brothers were convicted for possession of firearms by an 
illegal alien (DOJ, 2008).  They were sentenced to life in prison and will not be eligible 
for parole (Mulvihill, 2009b).  Dritan and Shain Duka were sentenced to an additional 30 
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years in prison due to the weapons charges.  The judge also ordered each of the Duka 
brothers to pay $125,000 to increase security at Fort Dix (Ryan, 2009b). 
E. CONCLUDING REMARKS   
The four case studies included in this review provide a broad view of the nature 
and type of threat that exists from foreign terrorists abusing the legal immigration system 
to embed themselves in the country.  They exploited a variety of benefit programs by 
submitting fraudulent applications to obtain status.  They also used several different 
tactics such as using fraudulent documents, false passports, creating false identities or 
aliases to avoid detection, providing false statements or information in support of 
applications for immigration benefits and overstaying the period of admission authorized 
pursuant to their nonimmigrant visa.  Therefore, the cases are useful in evaluating the 
country’s vulnerability and the types of corrective action needed.  The following chapter 
will outline several key recommendations to mitigate the risks identified through this 
analysis.   
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IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS TO ENHANCE THE LEGAL 
IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 
A. CHANGES TO DOMESTIC SECURITY POLICY IMPLEMENTED 
AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 
Immediately after the September 2001 attacks, the country reevaluated its strategy 
and laws designed to combat terrorism giving a greater focus to the connection between 
immigration and security (Brinkmann, 2004).  Perhaps the most significant change was 
the dissolution of the INS and the relocation of its functions under the umbrella of the 
newly created Department of Homeland Security (Martin & Martin, 2004).  Changes to 
the legal immigration system in response to the September 11, 2001 attacks included 
measures to strengthen the student visa program.  Colleges and universities were required 
to report on the enrollment of foreign students.  A special registration program for 
nationals from specific countries called the National Security Entry-Exit Registration 
System was mandated.  Foreign nationals subject to the special registration had to present 
themselves for personal interviews with immigration officials12 (Cornelius, 2004).   
The Department of Justice (DOJ) also implemented procedures to use 
immigration status violations as the basis to interview, detain or even deport suspected 
terrorist (Eldridge et al., 2004).  Specifically, DOJ could detain individuals for seven days 
without charges.  The individual must remain in detention until he or she is removed if 
the Attorney General certifies that the foreign national is deportable based on 
immigration or criminal grounds.  Furthermore, even if removal is not possible, the 
individual can remain in custody until the Attorney General determines that his or her 
release does not pose a threat to safety and security.  The government has typically relied 
on using minor immigration violations such as overstaying a visa rather than using 
terrorism specific provisions to charge suspect individuals.  In contrast to charges 
                                                 
12
 Initially, only five countries were included: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan and Syria.  The program was 
later expanded to include an additional 13 countries (Cornelius, 2004). 
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pertaining to terrorism, which often rely on insufficient or classified information, 
immigration charges are usually easier to prove (Martin, 2004).     
Additionally, Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act, which was the primary 
legislative package designed to enhance domestic counterterrorism and intelligence 
efforts (Martin, 2004).  Among other things, the USA PATRIOT Act expanded the 
definition of terrorist activity to include: 
…persons who have used positions of prominence within any country to 
endorse or espouse terrorist activity, or to persuade others to support 
terrorist activity or a terrorist organization, in a way that the Secretary of 
State has determined undermines the United States efforts to reduce or 
eliminate terrorist activities. (Martin, 2004, p. 5) 
The Immigration and Nationality Act was broadened after September 11, 2001 to 
include provisions to deny entry to representatives of organizations that endorse 
terrorism, prominent figures who endorse terrorism and, in some cases, the spouse or 
children of individuals who are removable based on terrorist grounds (Garcia & Wasem, 
2008).  The USA PATRIOT Act expanded the grounds for detaining foreign nationals 
who have been denied entry into the country or those who can be removed based on 
suspected ties to terrorist activity or organizations (Martin, 2004).   
Under the USA PATRIOT Act, the Federal Bureau of Investigations was required 
to share its criminal databases with immigration officials and Department of State 
officers responsible for visa issuance.  This level of information sharing was mandated 
prior to September 11, 2001 but was never implemented (Cornelius, 2004).  The USA 
PATRIOT Act also required the development of a technology standard based on 
biometric data that could be used to verify the identity of individuals applying for a visa 
or seeking to enter the United States by October 2003.  This technology standard was 
intended to be used across governmental agencies to achieve a fully interoperable method 
of sharing intelligence and law enforcement information.  The intention was to have this 
system readily available to law enforcement and intelligence officers, border agents, 
immigration officials and consular officers responsible for verifying the identity and 
criminal history of individuals seeking admission into the country (GAO, 2008a).    
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In January 2004, DHS implemented the US-Visit program to provide consular 
offices overseas and ports of entry with biometric technology that would establish and 
verify an individual’s identity when they enter the United States (DHS, 2008).  During an 
individual’s first encounter with immigration officials, a unique identifier, referred to as 
an enumerator, is assigned to the individuals record.  At that time, the individual’s 
biometrics, i.e., fingerprint and digital photograph, are captured and linked to the 
enumerator (GAO, 2008a).  This process normally begins overseas when the individual’s 
biometrics are captured at the DOS consular office that processes the visa.  The 
biometrics are then checked against a watch list pertaining to known suspected terrorists 
or criminals.  If the visa is issued, the same biometrics are checked again when the 
individual arrives at the port of entry in order to verify that it is the same person that was 
issued the visa (DHS, 2008).  Additional information about the individual is also made 
available to the screener, which enhances the ability to make proper risk or eligibility 
determinations (GAO, 2008a). 
Despite these improvements, there still remain significant vulnerabilities in the 
adjudication of immigration benefits, the enforcement of immigration laws, and the 
overall sharing of data between those responsible for administering immigration policy 
and the law enforcement and intelligence communities (Kephart, 2008).  In particular, 
adequate and timely sharing of information regarding potential threats across 
organizations continues to present significant challenges.  Because multiple agencies 
have overlapping responsibility for domestic intelligence activities, ensuring that these 
efforts are coordinated and integrated can be complicated (Jackson & Schaefer, 2009).  
Furthermore, many agencies or organizations that are not traditionally considered to be 
law enforcement entities may have information that could prove valuable to 
counterterrorism investigations (Jackson, 2009).  Immigration officials and border 
security officers “can stop terrorists if they have been told for whom to look by 
intelligence and law enforcement agencies; they should not be told to guess who is a 
danger on the basis of crude ethnic stereotypes” (War on Terrorism, 2003, p. 30).   
The case of Sheik Rahman illustrates the detrimental impact inadequate 
information sharing can have on counterterrorism investigations.  By 1987, the political 
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section in the Cairo Embassy had a developed a file on Rahman documenting his 
subversive activities.  The information that had been collected was sufficient grounds to 
deny his visa application.  However, due to poor information sharing, the derogatory 
information was not shared with the section responsible for issuing visas.  Furthermore, 
throughout the 1990s, the FBI gathered significant information on terrorist travel tactics 
obtained through several investigations, raids and seizures of terrorist hard drives.  
However, this information was not widely shared.  Information was only culled when it 
pertained to a specific case (Eldridge et al., 2004).  The attacks of September 11, 2001 
further highlight problems with interagency cooperation (Jackson & Schaefer, 2009).  
After the attacks, senior DOS officials discovered that the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) knew of the existence of two of the terrorists but they had failed to provide the 
information to DOS (Eldridge et al., 2004).  Unless these information-sharing problems 
are overcome, no policy designed to provide border security can truly be effective (War 
on Terrorism, 2003).   
Additionally, better mechanisms to share information regarding known or 
suspected terrorist must be established in order to prevent terrorist who are denied access 
from this country from engaging in illicit activities in another country (Camarota, 2002b).  
Merely denying an operative access into this country addresses the immediate threat 
domestically, but it does not prevent the same operative from being deployed to another 
country to attack U.S. interests or nationals overseas, nor does it reduce the risk that the 
terrorist will launch an attack against one of  nation’s, allies.  Homeland security efforts 
“can’t stop at a nation’s borders.  The same threats are present for all of us and we must 
work together to meet them...No one country can truly be safe without the cooperation 
and like-minded commitment of others’” (Rudolph, 2006, p. 213).  
Unfortunately, information sharing between the United States and its foreign 
allies is still inadequate when the magnitude of the threat is taken into consideration.  
Information regarding suspect terrorists is not shared on a consistent or regular basis 
(Martin, 2004).  The failure of foreign governments and federal agencies within the 
United States to share information may have helped facilitate terrorist travel.  The 
problems created by inadequate information sharing between the United States and its 
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foreign allies are illustrated by the cases of Zacarias Moussaoui and Mahmud 
Abouhalima, who were both known to have links to terrorism by foreign intelligence 
services.  Abouhalima was involved with a banned extremist organization as a teenager.  
He had been under surveillance by Egyptian authorities.  Before he left Egypt for 
Germany, many of his associates had been arrested.  He was granted a visa to come to the 
United States in Germany in 1985 because there was no information included on a watch 
list.  Similarly, Moussaoui was a suspected terrorist by French authorities.  This 
information was not shared, and his name was not included a U.S. watch list.  Because 
the information was never shared, both men were able to easily gain admission into the 
country (Camarota, 2002b).     
Increased cooperation and data sharing can help bring those who have engaged in 
acts of terrorism to justice and prevent foreign terrorists from moving easily between 
countries.  International collaboration can also help detect smuggling, or trafficking 
networks that potentially could be used by terrorists to gain access to the country (Martin, 
2004).  Joint international efforts played a significant part in the arrest of Ramzi Yousef.  
A local informant contacted the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan and provided officers there 
with information regarding Yousef’s whereabouts.  Several U.S. government agencies 
were involved in vetting the information and planning the operation to arrest him.  The 
Pakistani government provided full cooperation in the investigation, arrest and removal 
of Yousef.  Additionally, within a week of the 1998 African Embassy bombing, the FBI 
arrested two suspects in the Nairobi bombing with the cooperation of Kenyan police 
(Kushner, 2003).  Finally, beginning in October 2006, the United States began 
intercepting suspect email correspondence between Pakistan and Germany.  Critical 
information pertaining to this activity was shared with German officials through an 
investigation that was conducted by a joint task force located in Berlin.  As a result, a plot 
to use three car bombs to attack a U.S. military base in Germany, a major airport and a 
nightclub was discovered, and three suspects were arrested.  Rather than a tragic event, 
the attack was prevented with only a single shot being fired.  According to reports, the 
United States provided the most important pieces of information to German officials used  
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to uncover the plot (Kaiser, Rosenbach & Stark, 2007).  These examples illustrate that 
information obtained by foreign intelligence or law enforcement could be vital to 
preventing an attack domestically. 
B. PROPOSED RECOMMENDATIONS 
In order to reduce the nation’s vulnerability, all facets of the immigration system 
must be reformed.  Rather than rely on one mechanism, the strategy should encompass a 
broad range of activities to reduce risk associated with the manipulation of the legal 
immigration system.  This includes increasing information sharing regarding known or 
suspected terrorists, enhancing border security and screening, identifying suspect 
applications prior to the approval, improving the processing of visas overseas and better 
enforcement of immigration laws within the United States (Camarota, 2002b).  The 
following eight procedural recommendations should be implemented in order to address 
the systemic loopholes identified through the case study analysis.   The recommendations 
include efforts to improve the ability to detect threats to national security through 
increased information sharing and proactive efforts to detect fraud.  They also include 
aspects that focus on holding those who engage in illicit activities accountable, such as by 
expanding administrative penalties for committing immigration benefit fraud.  Both 
components are essential if the overall strategy is to be effective.   
1. Ensure Watch List Information is Consolidated and Updated 
Regularly 
The consolidation of watch lists must become a priority for all agencies that have 
a role in border security (Camarota, 2002b).  Although the operation of watch lists is not 
without some flaws, it is one of the central ways immigration and counterterrorism 
investigations are interrelated (Leiken, 2004).  The careful screening of individuals who 
apply for immigration benefits or appear at a port of entry is one of the main methods 
used to identify terrorists (Camarota, 2002b).  Watch lists or lookout systems are the 
primary tool used to identify terrorists and consist of a composite of information relating 
to several million individuals denied visas or entry into the country.  The information 
included generally consists of names, dates of birth, country of origin and passport 
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numbers.  The names of individuals who apply for immigration benefits including visas 
are checked against the watch list data (Camarota, 2002a).       
However, as the case studies illustrate, technological issues or procedural failures 
have enabled individuals to avoid detection (Camarota, 2002a).  Ali Mohammed and 
Sheik Abdel Rahman should not have been issued visas because their names were 
included on terrorist watch lists (Camarota, 2002b).  Two of the terrorists involved in the 
September 11, 2001 attacks were on watch lists for being suspected associates of bin 
Laden.  This should have precluded their entry into the country (Mylroie, 2001).  At least 
three of the terrorists involved in the September 11, 2001 attacks had entries in the 
information systems of the intelligence community.  If the derogatory information 
collected had been updated into terrorist watch lists, their connections to terrorist activity 
could have been discovered when they applied for a visa or appeared for inspection at the 
port of entry (Eldridge et al., 2004).   
The failure to check names properly or update information in a timely manner 
causes a critical breakdown in security when officials are making eligibility and risk 
determinations regarding foreign nationals seeking admission into the country (Camarota, 
2002b).  As late as January 2004, law enforcement officials, congressmen and 
counterintelligence experts did not feel the United States had an accurate and up to date 
watch list pertaining to known or suspected terrorists.  Federal agencies and state and 
local law enforcement were still using at least 12 different databases to check watch list 
information.  These efforts were often incompatible and uncoordinated (Leiken, 2004).  
The FBI did not even provide written instructions on how its employees should collect 
and disseminate information regarding terrorist for inclusion in watch lists prior to 
September 11, 2001 (Eldridge et al., 2004).  The nation’s vulnerability will be reduced if 
all information pertaining to known or suspected terrorists is consolidated in one central 
database that is readily accessible by all agencies that play a role in border security, 
including non-law enforcement entities like USCIS (Leiken, 2004).   
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2. Strengthen Information Sharing with Federal, State and Local Law 
Enforcement Entities 
Although useful in identifying threats, counterterrorism efforts should not rely 
solely on the use of watch lists.  They will not prevent a previously unknown subject 
from gaining admission into the country (White House, 2007).  Although no system or 
policy can completely eliminate the problem of previously unknown subjects evading 
detection, agencies responsible for border security should seek to create strong 
partnerships with federal, state and local law enforcement entities though participation in 
fusion centers to foster better information sharing (Surdin, 2006).  Because the agencies 
responsible for administering this nation’s immigration policies rely on information 
provided by outside entities, individuals and organizations must strive to increase access 
to accurate and timely intelligence regarding terrorists’ activities.  Past experience 
illustrates that foreign terrorists often live in local communities and engage in suspicious 
or criminal activities while they are planning their attack (White House, 2007).  
Terrorists:  
…routinely commit immigration and document fraud, and often sustain 
their operations with petty crime.  The routine enforcement of laws, 
including those not specifically related to terrorism, can therefore raise 
obstacles for and in some cases have a deterrent effect on individuals 
intending to commit terrorist attacks. (Eldridge et al., 2004, p. 160)     
Fusion centers can play a role in facilitating the exchange of information across 
organizational lines because they allow law enforcement officials to share information in 
separate databases and receive training on subjects not normally provided by their 
agencies (Surdin, 2006).  Information that is acquired for one purpose, such as combating 
immigration benefit fraud, may provide additional insights when combined with 
information collected for another purpose, such as an investigation into suspected 
terrorist activity.  For example, information regarding suspect financial transactions or 
lost or stolen passports could lead to information on individuals with links to terrorist 
activity (White House, 2007).  Because fusion centers are designed to maximize the 
ability to detect criminal and terrorists acts by bringing all relevant partners together to 
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share intelligence, they can play a crucial role in closing intelligence gaps that have 
hindered counterterrorism efforts in the past (DOJ & DHS, 2005).   
By creating strong partnerships with federal, state and local law enforcement 
entities though participation in the fusion centers, agencies involved in border security 
can facilitate the sharing of vital information and enhance their ability and the ability of 
other organizations to achieve the nation’s homeland security objectives.  In order to 
increase its collaboration with law enforcement and the intelligence community, but 
minimize the impact on existing limited resources, USCIS should implement a plan to co-
locate one officer in each fusion center located throughout the country on a limited basis.  
This assignment would be a collateral duty for the individuals selected.  Initially, the 
officers should devote no more than 50 percent of their time to working in the fusion 
centers.  Although there are those who are concerned with increased information sharing 
between immigration authorities and law enforcement, this strategy would enable USCIS 
to take advantage of an additional mechanism to exchange information, analyze data 
from a variety of sources and improve its ability to identify suspect filings or threats to 
national security without placing a significant burden on resources (DOJ & DHS, 2005).  
This would also give USCIS the ability to evaluate the quality and utility of the 
intelligence acquired before devoting a significant level of resources to the program.   
3. Increase Information Sharing with Foreign Partners 
The United States should expand on existing international information sharing 
initiatives and increase the number of mutual legal assistance treaties between the U.S. 
and its foreign allies.  Since the September 11, 2001 attacks, there has been increased 
awareness of the importance of international cooperation.  As a result, there has been an 
increase in bilateral and multilateral programs.  For example, through an initiative named 
“Global Justice”, the FBI and Department of Justice intend to significantly expand their 
role in international counterterrorism efforts.  This program involves having FBI agents 
participate more heavily in investigations overseas by questioning suspects and gathering 
evidence in an effort to obtain criminal prosecutions as much as possible (Meyer, 2009).  
In July 2009, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano signed an agreement formalizing the 
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Immigration Advisory Program with Spain.  This program is designed to help prevent the 
use of fraudulent travel documents, counter alien smuggling and prevent terrorists or 
other criminals from entering the country.  It will help identify high-risk foreign travelers 
before they are allowed to board a plane heading to the United States (DHS, 2009).  DOJ 
also has increased the number of FBI Legal Attaché offices in foreign countries from 44 
to over 60 offices and placed analysts in eight of these locations (DOJ, 2006).  Through 
these initiatives, the United States has shared information pertaining to threats with 
foreign partners, responded to hundreds of requests from foreign governments for 
assistance in counterterrorism investigations through the mutual legal assistance treaties 
and exchanged critical evidence needed in terrorism related prosecutions (DOJ, 2006).   
Additionally, the United States should establish greater connectivity between its 
terrorist related lookout systems and the European lookout system (Martin, 2004).  Long-
term efforts should include the establishment of a shared database that contains 
information pertaining to known or suspected terrorists from all available sources.  This 
type of database could help enhance the United States’ and its foreign partners' efforts to 
identify and apprehend terrorists, as well as prevent their travel between countries (Miko 
& Froehlich, 2004). 
However, although some steps have been taken to share previously restricted 
information, there are still a number of challenges that must be overcome before 
connectivity between the United States and European lookout systems can be established.  
For example, differences in privacy standards create obstacles for information sharing.  
Additionally, the inherent reluctance of intelligence agencies to share information even 
domestically will need to be overcome before connectivity between lookout systems can 
be achieved (Martin, 2004).  Officials in the United States have security concerns 
regarding sharing sensitive information with foreign law enforcement and intelligence 
officials.  Conversely, foreign officials have expressed concerns that the United States’ 
desire for information from foreign allies is not matched by its willingness to share 
information on an equal basis.  They also have concerns that authorities in the United 
States will use information provided to the U.S. in ways that conflict with the foreign 
countries’ policies regarding protecting civil liberties and the death penalty (Miko & 
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Froehlich, 2004).  The United States and its foreign allies should actively engage in 
negotiations to resolve these differences in order to foster greater information sharing. 
4. Use Biometrics to Verify Identity 
Due to its limited ability to verify identity, USCIS may provide benefits to 
ineligible aliens or fail to notify law enforcement when a criminal alien is encountered 
(DHS OIG, 2005).  USCIS should implement a system that uses biometrics to verify 
identity for all benefit categories.  Associating biographical and biometric data to 
individuals encountered by immigration officials increases the ability of officials to make 
eligibility determinations and risk assessments regarding individuals applying for 
immigration benefits (GAO, 2008a).  In order to address fraud: 
…immigration benefits adjudicators must have access to comprehensive 
biometrically based immigration histories that include information from 
the moment an individual first applies for a visa at a U.S. consulate or 
presents a passport at a port of entry through every subsequent request for 
an immigration benefit. (Kephart, 2005, p. 29)   
In the past, immigration officials had to rely on the names provided to them by the 
alien and check the names against agency paper records and databases. There are inherent 
vulnerabilities in conducting name-based background checks.  After conducting a review 
of USCIS’ security checks, the DHS Office of the Inspector General (OIG) concluded 
that these checks were overly dependent on the integrity of the biographic information 
and the supporting documents provided by the applicants (DHS OIG, 2005).   
The DHS OIG found that there are several reasons why USCIS has little 
assurances that the information provided is accurate and related to the identity of the 
individual seeking the benefit. The accuracy of name-based checks is dependent on the 
accuracy of the biographic information provided by the individual.  Because the 
information is self-reported, individuals with a criminal history have an incentive to 
falsify or withhold information that may lead to the prior record being revealed during the 
screening process.  For example, if the individual used an alias when he or she was 
arrested, there is an incentive to withhold disclosing that name when applying for an 
immigration benefit.  If that name is withheld, the prior record will not be uncovered if 
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the only checks conducted are name-based checks.  Also, if an individual changes names, 
such as after a marriage, name-based searches may miss a record that is associated with 
the prior name.  Misspelled names or typographical errors also can cause a related record 
not to be identified.  Names with hyphenated spellings or the transliteration of non-
English names further complicate name-based searches and could also cause records to 
be missed.  Finally, common names often generate false hits that do not actually relate to 
the individual (DHS OIG, 2005).   
In contrast, security checks based on biometric information, which includes 
fingerprints, photographs and iris scans, offers a more reliable mechanism to verify 
identity and screen for criminal history.  Checks based on biometric identification would 
reveal any prior arrest or conviction even if the individual were arrested under a different 
name.  Therefore, using biometric data to screen individuals limits fraud and reduces the 
likelihood of false positive or negative results (DHS OIG, 2005).  If biometric data had 
been used to verify Sheik Rahman’s identity, his true identity would have been 
discovered and his access to immigration benefits would have been denied.  Instead, he 
was allowed to re-enter the country after his was linked to the assassination of Egyptian 
President Anwar Sadat and his name was entered into a lookout system for possible links 
to terrorism because he used an alias (Peddie & Laikin, 2001).    
Although USCIS collects fingerprints and photographs from many applicants, in 
most cases the biometrics are used to generate cards that are used as evidence of an 
immigration status or for criminal history checks.  Typically, they are not compared 
electronically to verify identity.  This presents a significant vulnerability for identity 
fraud.  However, for certain benefit categories, the agency supplements its name-based 
checks with biometric checks to verify identity.  For example, USCIS asylum offices 
have used the Automatic Biometric Identification System (IDENT) to screen individuals 
since 1998.  Applicants for asylum are enrolled in the IDENT system to compare them 
against previous applicants, immigration lookout databases pertaining to criminal aliens 
and the immigration recidivist database (DHS OIG, 2005).  Their biometrics are captured 
and compared to verify the applicant’s identity when he or she appears at an asylum 
office for an interview.  The Asylum Division is able to “lock in” an applicant’s identity 
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by comparing the applicant’s biometrics at several points during the process.  This use of 
technology has enabled the division to combat and reduce imposter fraud, identify 
individuals who have applied under more than one name and link multiple files to the 
same individual.  For example, in 2004, the asylum division identified 2,000 confirmed 
hits through screening against the IDENT databases (DHS OIG, 2005). 
Outside of the asylum program, USCIS does not routinely check IDENT to verify 
identity.  For example, in 2004 only approximately two percent of all applications 
completed that year were screened against IDENT.  When other security checks reveal 
derogatory information and the individual’s identity is in question, some offices outside 
of the asylum division will screen an applicant’s fingerprints against the IDENT system 
on a case-by-case basis.  However, this is an ad-hoc process rather than an official 
procedure.  Local district offices do not capture, store and check fingerprints against 
IDENT on a routine bases to “lock in” in the identity like the asylum offices (DHS OIG, 
2005).  USCIS should expand the use of IDENT to all benefit programs in order to help 
verify the identity of applicants.  Absent these checks, USCIS may grant status to 
individuals when they should be removed from the country.     
5. Utilize Pattern and Trend Analysis Technology 
In response to concerns raised regarding the adequacy of efforts to detect 
immigration fraud, USCIS established the Office of Fraud Detection and National 
Security (FDNS) in May 2004.  FDNS is responsible for developing, coordinating and 
overseeing the agency’s anti-fraud efforts.  Officers in the anti-fraud units use 
government and commercial database checks, perform internet searches and conduct 
interviews and on site inspections to detect fraud or material misrepresentations.  They 
also conduct benefit fraud assessments to measure the level of fraud in certain benefit 
categories (DHS OIG, 2008).  The agency’s anti-fraud program could be enhanced if it 
combined its existing process with proactive pattern and trend analysis to screen 
incoming receipts in order to identify suspect cases at the time of submission.   
One of the lessons learned from the September 11, 2001 attacks was the impact 
that the failure to share and analyze intelligence had on domestic security.  Improving the 
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gathering and synthesizing of information pertaining to foreign nationals could enhance 
efforts to detect and deter immigration benefit fraud or identify terrorist travel patterns.  
Many of the terrorists included in the case studies had links with one another.  They 
shared addresses, were associated with similar organizations or had known connections 
with one another.  The terrorists involved in the September 11, 2001 attacks also “did not 
take significant steps to mask their identities or obscure their activities.  They were hiding 
in plain sight” (Jonas & Harper, 2006, p. 3).  They lived together, shared P.O. boxes, and 
used the same credit card, address and phone number to make flight reservations (Jonas 
& Harper, 2006).    
Current technological advances in pattern and trend analysis software allow 
organizations to identify unknown patterns by searching existing data.  Pattern and trend 
analysis involves using tools to discern previously unknown trends or relationships 
among large sets of data.  This information can then be used to make predictions 
regarding future actions (Jonas & Harper, 2006).   Products such as IBM’s Entity 
Analytics and identity resolution software can provide real-time data matches (TSA’s 
Secure Flight, 2009).  Entity Analytics name recognition software was designed to detect 
fraud or other threats.  It can help organizations manage data in the new global 
environment because it takes into account alternative spellings and other linguistic and 
cultural variations (IBM Entity, 2006).  The software can compare data such as name, 
date of birth and gender to determine likely matches and also identify relationships 
between people, addresses or entities that are not obvious.  It can overcome spelling 
variations or other attempts to avoid detection and analyze information within multiple 
information silos (TSA’s Secure Flight, 2009).  The technology can create linkages 
among individuals that know each other to discover relationships that are not obvious on 
the surface, such as common addresses, bank accounts or phone numbers.  It can also 
match identities without using data elements such as social security numbers or national 
ID card numbers (DB2 Anonymous Resolution, 2005).   
The lessons learned from the case studies illustrate that efforts to prevent terrorists 
from exploiting the legal immigration system must also focus on aggregating the myriad 
of data contained in immigration databases to discern both obvious and non obvious 
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connections, threats and patterns of suspect activity (Jonas & Harper, 2006).  The 
example of Sheik Rahman illustrates that slight variations in the way a name is spelled or 
typographical errors can cause a record to be overlooked.  Because these software 
programs can match names based on sound rather than exact spelling, problems with 
transliteration or pronunciation that result from working with various cultural naming 
patterns can be overcome.  This type of technological enhancement could overcome some 
of the challenges USCIS faces when trying to discern those individuals seeking 
immigration benefits who present a risk to the safety and security of the nation.  It would 
provide USCIS and other organizations involved in administering the legal immigration 
system additional insight into criminal activities or potential threats (Jonas & Harper, 
2006).  USCIS would be able to conduct more effective background checks and screen 
potential threats across its diverse applicant population using this technology (IBM 
Entity, 2006).     
6. Implement a Registration System in the United States 
In order to better track and monitor the movement of foreign nationals living in 
the country, the United States should augment existing registration requirements for 
foreign nationals.  Interior enforcement of immigration laws would be enhanced if 
foreign nationals could not conduct routine activities such as obtain employment, rent 
apartments, attend schools, obtain drivers’ licenses or maintain bank accounts if the 
registration requirement and verification of their immigration status had not been 
completed.  In addition to limiting terrorists’ ability to live and operate in the United 
States, this policy would also assist law enforcement in locating suspect terrorists, 
establishing links between targets, and identifying additional conspirators.  In Germany, 
the restrictions imposed to ensure change of addresses are promptly updated proved to be 
valuable in locating terrorists because it helped to link addresses to corresponding 
individuals.  German officials were quickly able to locate foreign students after 
September 11, 2001 because they were able to cross reference residence information with 
university lists.  Furthermore, German authorities were able to establish connections 
between the members of the Hamburg cell because the members were required to comply 
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with the existing laws regarding updating residency records.  Conversely, because similar 
measures did not exist in the United States, after the September 11, 2001 attacks 
authorities for the INS and the FBI were not able to easily locate suspect foreign 
nationals (Leiken, 2004).   
Efforts to enforce immigration law in the interior of the country are inadequate.  
Once an individual gains admission into the country, the United States does not 
effectively track the movements of foreign nationals (Martin, 2004).  Comprehensive, 
continued enforcement of immigration laws and policies is a fundamental tool in 
counterterrorism efforts.  Weaknesses in interior enforcement and border security present 
a significant vulnerability that can be exploited by terrorists.  Reports indicate that 
smuggling networks are extensive (Krikorian, 2007).  Strengthening the borders to 
prevent illegal entry is a crucial element to a sound immigration strategy.  If terrorists are 
unable to obtain visas or other immigration benefits, they will attempt to enter across the 
borders illegally (Camarota, 2002b).  Although the majority of individuals who cross the 
border illegally do so in search of employment opportunities and do not present a threat 
to security, the same weaknesses in the system that allow these individuals to enter can be 
exploited by terrorists (Martin & Martin, 2004).  Furthermore: 
…allowing a large illegal population to reside in the United States 
facilitates terrorism for two reasons.  First it has created a large 
underground industry that furnishes illegals with fraudulent identities and 
documents that terrorists can (and have) tapped into.  Several of the 9/11 
terrorists were assisted in getting their Virginia drivers’ licenses from 
someone who specialized in helping run-of-the-mill illegal aliens obtain 
them. (Camarota, 2002b, p. 53)   
An illegal Salvadorian immigrant provided fraudulent residency certificates that 
claimed that two of the 9/11 hijackers lived at his old address.  The terrorists used these 
certificates to obtain Virginia drivers’ licenses.  The address provided by the Salvadoran 
immigrant was used by three of the other terrorists involved to obtain Virginia drivers’ 
licenses (Eldridge et al., 2004).   
The ability to track foreign nationals once they have entered the country has 
presented significant challenges for immigration authorities.  Currently, there is no 
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adequate system in place to track foreign nationals who have overstayed their visas or 
entered the country illegally (Grimaldi, Fainaru & Gaul, 2001).  Section 265.(a) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act requires foreign nationals to provide written notification 
within 10 days of any change of address.  However, there is no mechanism in place to 
ensure compliance with this requirement (Leiken, 2004).  The lack of enforcement of the 
registration requirement results in government officials being unable to determine when 
many foreign nationals entered the country, where they resided and when, and if, they left 
the country (War on Terrorism, 2003).  This situation is “dangerous and ripe for abuse by 
aliens wishing to stay below the radar, including terrorists” (War on Terrorism, 2003, p. 
2).   
Several terrorists included in the cases studies, including El Sayyid Nosair, Fadil 
Abdelgani, Mahmud Abouhalima, Mohammed Abouhalima, Mohammed Salameh and 
Eyad Ismoil, took advantage of weak interior enforcement and continued to live and work 
in the country illegally.  Investigations into the terrorists involved in the September 11, 
2001 attacks also reveal that although some of them overstayed their visas, they had little 
difficulty in obtaining drivers’ licenses, opening bank accounts or attending flight school 
(Leiken, 2004).  In fact, 14 of the terrorists involved obtained drivers’ licenses or 
identification cards from Virginia or Florida (Eldridge et al., 2004).  Furthermore, a study 
conducted by the Center for Immigration Studies found that 25 percent of the foreign 
nationals who had been charged, convicted, pled guilty or admitted to involvement in 
terrorism from 1993 to after the September 11, 2001 attacks were in the country illegally 
when they committed their crimes (Camarota, 2002b).    
The arrests of the terrorists involved in the Fort Dix plot generated criticism of the 
immigration system that has allowed approximately 12 million illegal aliens to live in this 
country undetected.  The lack of immigration status did not affect the ability three of the 
terrorists convicted for plotting to attack the Fort Dix military base to function in society 
and conduct routine daily activities.  The Duka brothers were able to live and work in this 
country without detection. Although a birth certificate or passport is required to register a 
student, schools in New Jersey are forbidden to verify the immigration status of the 
student.  Shain Duka was able to obtain a driver’s license and both Eljvir and Dritan 
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Duka were able to obtain driving permits.  Dritan Duka also obtained a non-driver 
identification card (Moroz, 2007).  They were able to enroll in school, hold jobs and 
register to own businesses even after they had repeated encounters with law enforcement.  
According to motor vehicle records, the brothers were stopped by police approximately 
12 times and received almost 50 traffic citations.  The offences ranged from speeding to 
careless driving (Moroz, 2007).  However, they lived in sanctuary cities where law 
enforcement officers do not routinely provide information regarding illegal aliens to 
immigration officials (Brothers Charged in Terror, 2007).   
Allowing individuals who are in the country illegally to hold jobs, open bank 
accounts or receive drivers’ licenses provides terrorists the opportunity to violate 
immigration laws and facilitates their ability to engage in illegal activity.  It would be 
significantly more difficult for terrorists to overstay their visa or remain in this country 
illegally if they were prevented from engaging in these activities through the enforcement 
of a registration and status verification requirement.  Furthermore, increased interior 
enforcement could create a deterrent effect; individuals could be discouraged from 
attempting to evade immigration laws because of the increased potential of being caught 
(Camarota, 2002b).     
7. Require Voice Recognition for Asylum Applicants 
In order to combat fraud in the asylum program, USCIS should require voice 
recordings for asylum applicants to determine the exact country of origin. Because the 
events that form the basis of an asylum claim occurred overseas, it is difficult for officers 
to fully investigate the claim.  In many cases, “when asylum seekers flee persecution or 
war in their home countries, they often arrive in a new country seeking asylum, without 
documentation that can prove their nationality” (Eades, 2005, p. 503).  Terrorists seeking 
entry into the country have easily exploited these weaknesses.  Several of the terrorists 
involved in the case studies, including Ahmad Ajaj, Ramzi Yousef and Sheik Abel 
Rahman, exploited the asylum program to enter or remain in the country.  At least six al 
Qaeda operatives have manipulated the asylum laws to gain access to this country 
(Camarota, 2002c).  A review conducted by the Center for Immigration Studies examined 
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the immigration histories of 48 foreign-born terrorists who had been charged, convicted, 
pled guilty or admitted to involvement in terrorism from 1993 to after the September 11, 
2001 attacks.  The study found that 6 percent of the individuals included in the review 
filed for asylum (Camarota, 2002b).  These examples illustrate how terrorists have 
exploited the asylum program and highlight the need for programmatic reform.   
Today individuals are fleeing a wide variety of oppressive conditions in even 
greater numbers.  This increased influx of refugees and asylum-seekers creates enormous 
challenges for the countries receiving them.  Officials must discern those that are truly 
fleeing persecution in their country of origin verses those that merely are fleeing harsh 
economic conditions or those seeking to exploit loopholes in this humanitarian program 
in order to engage in criminal activity (Alink, Boin & T’Hart, 2001).  Many governments, 
including New Zealand, Great Britain, Australia, Germany and Belgium, are using 
language analysis in order to validate asylum seekers’ nationality claims.  This policy is 
based on the assumption that speech patterns can provide clues to an individual’s country 
of origin.  When the immigration official doubts the veracity of the asylum applicant’s 
claim, he or she can have the individual interviewed for the purpose of language analysis.  
The applicant can be interviewed in their native language or the applicant can be 
interviewed in an international linqua franca, such as English (Eades, 2005).  
Immigration officials in Great Britain found that language analysis has been a valuable 
tool in identifying cases where the asylum applicant was not from the country or area 
claimed.  It has also helped legitimate applicants validate their claims (Iraqi Refugees to 
Face Language Checks, 2003).  The USCIS Asylum Program could significantly reduce 
the likelihood of fraud and increase security by implementing a policy requiring voice 
recordings for asylum applicants to determine the exact country of origin.  
8. Expand Existing Bars and Penalties for Committing Immigration 
Fraud 
USCIS should seek a legislative change to extend Section 204(c) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) to cover all individuals or entities that attempt to 
obtain an immigration benefit through fraudulent means.  INA Section 204(c) provides 
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that if there is evidence that an individual has attempted or conspired to enter into a 
marriage for the purpose of evading immigration laws, the petition must be denied.  
Furthermore, all subsequent petitions filed for the foreign national must also be denied.  
Therefore, if an alien has attempted or conspired to enter into a fraudulent marriage, 
USCIS would also be barred from approving an employment-based petition filed on his 
or her behalf.  The prior petition does not have to be denied for fraud in order for the 
marriage fraud bar to apply.  However, evidence of the attempt or conspiracy must be 
contained in the foreign national’s immigration file.  This recommendation seeks to 
create a general bar to filing any petition if the petitioner or beneficiary has previously 
committed immigration fraud.   
Additionally, civil monetary penalties and immigration filing debarment 
authorities should be implemented to deter immigration fraud.  The debarment provision 
should be authorized to prohibit a petitioner and/or beneficiary from participation in 
various immigrant and nonimmigrant programs for a period of up to 10 years, require the 
payment of a substantial fine or civil monetary penalty as punishment for the fraud and 
require the petitioner or beneficiary to apply to USCIS for reinstatement as a prerequisite 
to future participation in any immigration benefit program.  Attorneys who have assisted 
with or gained knowledge of fraudulent actions on behalf of their clients also should face 
debarment from practicing law.  These provisions could create a deterrent effect and 
prevent individuals from committing serial violations of immigration law.   
C. CONCLUSION 
Today, “global terrorism is entwined with immigration” (Leikun, 2004, p. 23).  
The reality that foreign terrorists seek to exploit loopholes in the international travel 
system to facilitate the planning and implementation of attacks has become clearer since 
the attacks of September 11, 2001.  The lessons learned from those tragic events illustrate 
that the United States’ legal immigration system has been exploited to further illegal 
activities that threaten national security, and highlight the importance of improving the 
monitoring and control of terrorist travel as a means of constraining their activities 
(National Counterterrorism Center, 2006).  Terrorists, “including al Qaeda, clearly 
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expended considerable effort thinking about travel and engaging in methods intended to 
facilitate their movement around the globe” (Eldridge et al., 2004 p. 60).   
The terrorists involved in the case studies, as well as the 9/11 hijackers, needed to 
manipulate the immigration system in order to embed themselves in the country and carry 
out their attacks.  As discussed previously, they accomplished these goals by entering 
into sham marriages with U.S. citizens, filing fraudulent asylum claims and illegitimately 
obtaining temporary worker status.  Often the mere act of filing an application for an 
immigration benefit was sufficient to allow the foreign national to remain in the country 
while the case was pending.  These actions enabled the terrorists involved to conduct 
surveillance, obtain funding, acquire the requisite materials, coordinate operations and 
finally execute their plans (Eldridge et al., 2004).   
Because they are interconnected, immigration policy should play a pivotal role in 
the nation’s efforts to combat terrorist threats.  Leaders of western nations “must now 
take into account the export of violence via migration.  Al Qaeda and its affiliates depend 
on immigration to gain entry into the West in order to carry out terrorist plots” (Leiken, 
2004, p. 6).  However, efforts to reform the immigration system should not overlook the 
reality that only a few individuals seeking admission have terrorist connections.  National 
security cannot be the sole basis that drives immigration policy.  The legal immigration 
system must continue to function as a means to facilitate migration (Leiken, 2004).  The 
challenge in this age of global terrorism is to detect and prevent those who present threats 
to national security from gaining access to the country while maintaining an open 
international travel system (National Commission, 2004).   
While seeking to detect and deter threats to national security, reforms to 
immigration policy should also be balanced with the protection of civil liberties (Martin 
& Martin, 2004).  Acknowledging the nexus between immigration and security does not 
necessarily require the implementation of more restrictive immigration policies.  
However, it does require comprehensive reforms like the recommendations presented as a 
result of this research which are designed to prevent those who intend to do the country 
harm from entering the country (Rudolph, 2006).   
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